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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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EAST EUROPE REPORT POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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FUEL CONSERVATION AFFECTING FLIGHT TRAINING

East Berlin MILITAERTECHNIK in German No 2, 1984 (signed to press 13 Jan 84 pp 82-83)

[Article by Col J. Dieckmann, military scientist: "Economy in the Combat Training of Fighter Forces"]

[Text] The fighter forces of the air force/air defense command must preserve a high level of combat readiness with available working time, basic equipment and expendable supply resources. Great quantities of fuel and energy are used especially in air force combat training. For this reason our objective must be to guarantee the mandatory level of combat capability with minimum expenditure. The only way this goal can be attained is through long-term and comprehensive planning, thorough analysis at every level of command and by involving all members of the armed forces personally.

The decisive factor for this is the effectiveness of ideological indoctrination. It must be convincing and must elicit attitudes and insights. Only those who have recognized the necessity for practicing economy will give consideration to making a personal contribution. This is true specifically for:

- qualifying in specialist basic and advanced training and through self-study; a high level of knowledge must be acquired this way on aerodynamics, methodology and tactics;
- -training with the help of aviation training apparatus which is designed to develop such capabilities and skills as the use of aircraft controls and equipment, observation sequence of flight and flight control equipment, coordination of operation and observation;
- qualifying for leadership, in which the following processes required for air force combat training must be optimized:
 - -- organization of preparation and planning;
 - --execution of combat training and its ground support and
 - --methodology of flight operations and flight and fighter operational control.
- 1. Economies in Combat Training

During the training year 1981/82 it was our goal to make a saving of 470,600 marks, and by complying with directives from the 3rd Central Committee Session, an additional saving of 33,400 marks. We managed a total saving of 1,264,000 marks.

In the area of jet fuel, diesel fuel and gasoline, we obtained the following results:

- a lowering of consumption of jet fuel per flying hour; a saving of 550 tons;
- saving fuel by coordinating transportation needs: 21,800 marks;
- recovering aircraft drainage: 14,600 marks.
- 2. The Role of Leadership

The quality and effectiveness of combat training depend on taut leadership and a general sense of discipline. On the basis of tasks given by the commanders and lower superiors, great and circumscribed obligations are assumed within the socialist competition.

The largest savings are made in jet fuel. It constitutes about 90 percent of all fuels distributed. Its consumption is monitored daily by the commander and his deputies, by the unit commanders all the way down to the pilots, engineers, mechanics and tank truck drivers. This is done in the following manner:

- by way of the provisions in organizational directives for the preparation and execution of combat training;
- by flight directives at the air base and
- in the methodology of conducting flight operations.

The effectiveness of combat training is determined by quantitative and qualitative criteria. Their evaluation constitutes a daily task of the command function.

One of the criteria is the average flying time per sortie, which indicates the ratio of total flying time to the number of takeoffs. The smaller the number of takeoffs needed to attain the prescribed flying time for the training year, the lower the use of jet fuel. This item is particularly influenced by the provisions about the organization of combat training and flight operations. These provisions include retrofitting for other types of armament and equipment, the rules for engine starting and taxiing to achieve shorter engine operation on the ground and the time of operation of starting equipment.

Another criterion is the consumption of jet fuel per flying hour. During the last three training years we have succeeded in lowering it systematically. At the same time, combat performance as well as combat realism in training

were increased. This item is particularly influenced by new ideas for preparing pilots for their flights and by the performance of guidance officers at the command posts. Effective political-ideological indoctrination is an essential factor in this. Every member of the armed forces must be included; no idea must be lost track of; any deficiency must be corrected immediately. Any aborted aerial combat exercise, any failed interception or air-to-ground firing affects the statistics and lowers efficiency.

3. The Use of Jet Fuel

Jet fuel consumption is documented at the fuel depot as well as by the flight engineer from the amount put into the fuel tanks, and by the pilot from the fuel gage in the aircraft. Careful monitoring helps to discover and eliminate errors and deficiencies in the fuel supply process. Comparative exercises have shown that differences in consumption of up to 300 liters occur among individual pilots. The reasons for this are deficiencies in control technique as well as in the use of the afterburner.

Engineering inspections are planned in such a way that the service life inspections of aircraft can be reduced to a minimum. If service life inspections of all aircraft in a fighter wing are required only once per month (if the downtime of the aircraft is more than 15 days), this results in additional consumption of 9 tons of jet fuel.

Jet fuel eliminated in fuel testing via the drainage system can be recovered and can be reused upon reprocessing. In a fighter wing this amounts to about 600 liters per month.

Significant quantities of jet fuel are used on the ground during combat training, about 100-250 liters per sortie. Consumption depends on:

- the sequence of startup and immediate taxiing;
- checking time at the technical checkpoint;
- unimpeded taxiing to the runway for takeoff and
- immediate and unimpeded taxiing after landing to the engine starting area and cutting the engines off.

Reduced taxiing times and an increase in average flying time per sortic resulted for our fighter wing during the 1980/91 training year in a saving of 650 tons and for 1981/82 a further saving of 550 tons.

4. The Role of Planning

Flight planning is significant for lowering fuel consumption in combat training. It determines taxiing time and average flying time. The sequence of flight operations after flight clearance as well as the tactical content and the interaction of several flight tasks in an optimal flight plan must be well coordinated. This process is further influenced by such pilot

problems as license, state of training, flying technique and formation flying. In our fighter wing, we have found it useful to do our flight planning in the form of "aircraft planning." It simplifies the supervision of combat training by the operations group and the commanders of the service units and thus increases flying safety in the area controlled by the air controller and of the command post. In the past, air control personnel were against this method because it requires deep knowledge and intellectual effort to keep up with the methodology. We have overcome this situation by systematic qualification of the personnel.

5. Methodology of Flight Execution

It is based on increasing average flying time by using optimal armament configurations and complex combat training procedures. We have succeeded in drastically reducing the number of necessary takeoffs. For every engine startup as well as for takeoff and landing there is a saving of 500 liters of jet fuel. There is nothing new in complex exercises for pilots training. However, the objective is to combine several different combat and simulated combat elements in a single flight in a realistic sequence. The different possibilities are calculated in terms of theoretical formulas for fuel consumption.

Following this, we indicate which elements must be practiced as a complex. Various tasks for such a flight are:

- interception with guided missiles;
- typical attacks with cannon;
- individual search-and-destroy missions against aerial targets at extremely low altidudes;
- reconnaissance and attacks on fixed and moving ground targets.

Implementation of tasks in flight makes great demands on the knowledge, skill and concentration, mainly those of the pilot. The theoretical grasping of the entire process of the flight operation, the comprehension by all those involved is the key to the quality of the training.

Tactical problems must be an ever-present component of the combat training of flying personnel. If these problems also deal strongly with fuel problems, they become essential in introducing realism into combat training.

From both the economic and tactical standpoint, fighter control must not be underestimated. It must determine not only the arrival at the initial attack position in the shortest possible time, including the fuel supply advantage, but also adherence to launch conditions for guided missiles by the pilot. Every second of flight in pursuing the target, every additional maneuver necessary for reaching the interception starting point increase fuel consumption and worsen the tactical situation. The fuel reserves for aerial combat diminishes and return to base may become impossible.

6. Final Observations

Economy in air force combat training will always be a decisive leadership element for any commander. Disregarding it causes an impairment of the effectiveness of combat training as well as combat readiness of the command. There are specific limits for reducing consumption; they are determined by the mission. However, effectiveness is influenced daily by men involved in the processes of preparation, implementation and evaluation of combat training.

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HUNGARY

CULTURAL EXCHANGE WITH ROMANIA DISCUSSED

Budapest ELET ES IRODALOM in Hungarian 25 May 84 p 7

[Interview with Ion Traian Stefanescu: "Romanian-Hungarian Cultural Exchange Can be Developed Further;" answers provided in writing, date not specified]

[Text] The Romanian delegation to the 12th conference of ministers of culture from socialist countries, held in Hungary, was led by Ion Traian Stefanescu, the first deputy chairman of the socialist cultural and educational council. We publish here his answers in writing to the questions we presented to him.

[Question] The picture that the socialist countries have of Romanian cultural life has become more subtle in recent years. Obviously, the views held in Romania about intellectual processes and values in the socialist countries have also changed. What is your opinion of these changes?

[Answer] Naturally, in Romania, in the other socialist countries and in the whole world the image of intellectual phenomena is constantly being reassessed. The level of intellectual production is rising and as a function of this in the exchanges between Romania and the other socialist countries in recent years elements of a higher order of value have appeared—and as a consequence the views held by all the receiving socialist countries regarding the intellectual process have been enriched. Romanian culture and the culture of the other socialist countries has opened on the whole world—or we carry into our own country whatever is a true value elsewhere, and we transmit the best of our own treasures; this has also modified in a good direction the picture that has developed of the increasing intellectual exchanges among our countries. As for ourselves, we esteem highly all works of actual value which serve human and mutual understanding, the bringing together of peoples and their understanding of one another—whether these come from our country or from elsewhere.

[Question] For decades cultural exchanges between our two countries have been regulated by special agreement. In your judgment what possibilities exist for the further development of the agreement and of cultural exchange?

[Answer] The agreement regulates the theoretical framework of the exchanges in the spirit of inter-party agreements at the highest level. The multi-year, or 5-year, cooperation programs are built on this--and on new facts in the

development of Romanian and Hungarian culture. As a function of the intellectual growth of the two countries and the increasingly excellent results, opportunities are opening up for Romanian-Hungarian cultural exchanges. At their characteristic level these programs and exchanges reflect the general cooperation and friendship of our parties, peoples and countries. We have had good results in our cultural relations in recent years and the possibilities for development exist in the future.

[Question] Good cooperation has developed between our writers federations. What is your judgment of our literary relations—and of future possibilities and perspectives?

[Answer] The relations of the two writers federations are in fact good; this is also evident in the lively activity designed for mutual familiarity with and the review of works; the literary journals mutually publish articles, studies on the life and works of Romanian or Hungarian writers. Exchange visits by poets, prose writers and critics, colloquiums and symposiums are important, expressive factors in the understanding and friendly atmosphere which characterizes the cooperation of the two writers federation. I would like to emphasize the usefulness and purposefulness of our writers exchanges in recent years; these have made a good impression in both countries, obviously also because both sides have organized discussions, published articles and held radio and television interviews of literary life in the other country. The perspectives for the development of cooperation are encouraging and bright, for we know that they serve the further goals of bringing us together and prompting friendly understanding.

[Question] We feel that we must do everything for the objective enlightenment of minds free from prejudice. In your judgment, how could we deepen the mutual recognition and understanding as a mark of open, unbiased and sincere consideration for each other?

[Answer] It has always been our view that mutual intellectual recognition must be marked by a friendly, sincere attitude and consideration. It is in this spirit that we have dealt with the questions of deepening our cooperation, and we have strictly applied the guidelines of our party policy in this way. We devote special attention to the socialist countries, particularly to the development of our relations with neighboring socialist countries. It is in this spirit that our relations are developing with a socialist, neighboring and friendly Hungary. And I believe that, on the whole, positive results are not lacking in our relations. If you think only of those statements which are included in the various questions put by you (Romanian-Hungarian book publications and the cooperation of Romanian and Hungarian theaters. etc.) we can already draw the most favorable conclusions in regard to "the objective enlightenment of minds free from all prejudice." To continue on this path-which is our firm resolve--is as much as to continue deepening mutual recognition and understanding, and increasingly better cooperation. The main thing is that we should in every case assure that public opinion is informed correctly and objectively, and above all we should emphasize that which in the course of history united our peoples living today under new socialist conditions, and who now as neighbors and friends are making a joint effort.

[Question] The Romanian theater has an outstandingly good reputation in Hungary. The appearance of Romanian and Romanian-Hungarian theaters, actors and directors is always very successful. In the past decade or two our periodicals have frequently reported with jealousy, in the good sense of the word, on the achievements of the Romanian and Hungarian theater in Romania. What is the secret of the developed nature of the Romanian theater—and do you see a way of increasing cultural exchanges in this area?

[Answer] The post-war traditions of Romanian, Hungarian, German and Yiddish dramatic art have deep roots in the pre-war past of the previous century and even earlier. With an active and open cultural policy our party and state have supported materially and morally every value inherited from the past, and under the conditions of socialism have given incentive to dramatic art in the language of the Romanians and of the nationalities living together with them. The Bucharest theater and film college and the one in Marosvasarhely offered, and offer now, high-level training to our professional people; their continuation training is conducted at the work place and in special courses. It is true that we can speak of a strong, creative Romanian theatrical school which is sensitive to innovations. In Hungary, too, you enjoy excellent achievements in this area. In my judgment our cooperation in the field of theater can be further developed. This is also shown by the Romanian theater festival in Hungary and the Hungarian theater festival in Romania in the 1983-1984 season. We have also agreed on other joint plans in the future.

[Question] About 200 books appear annually in Romania in the Hungarian language, about one-half of these are published by Kriterion. This exemplary ethnology institution has won great recognition with its work not only in Hungary but throughout the world. How do you judge this publishing house, and in what direction does Romania wish to develop its activity?

[Answer] No doubt you know that our party's nationality policy assures to all nationality workers, without differentiation, the conditions for its full realization in economic, socio-political and cultural life. In this spirit, which is embodied in actual facts, we established Kriterion years ago. For the intellectual life of nationalities living together in Romania, Kriterion is above all an expression of our efforts to create broad forms of deeply democratic realization. Kriterion publishes books in Hungarian, German, Serbo-Croatian, Ukrainian, Yiddish and other nationality languages in Romania. In addition, Kriterion assures that valuable works in the nationality languages are translated into Romanian, and vice versa. I need to add that there are other Romanian publishers besides Kriterion which publish a certain number of books in the languages I have mentioned. The percentage of the number of publications (or titles) corresponds in the total publisher plans at least to every nationality's ratio in the population. We hold in esteem the publication of books in the nationality languages in Romania because of what it does for the validation of the nationalities' intellectual life and because with its own characteristic means it strengthens, without nationality differentiation, the unity and brotherhood of all workers living in our country. We do not maintain that the course taken by Kriterion thus far has been only and exclusively characterized by full success; and this

is true, of course, also of other publishing houses in our country. In light of the accumulated experiences and with the requirements that have been placed on the Romanian publishing houses, Kriterion will obviously improve its activity in the future.

[Question] The training of musicians, actors, stage directors and artists, in general, is at a high level in your country. Would there be a possibility for an exchange of students and teachers to meet the interests of both sides? A similar solution might be conceivable in the field of ethnographic and folklore research training, orchestra and choir director training, and in certain linguistic and literary fields.

[Answer] The questions you have raised belong not to this Council's sphere of authority but in our institutional system to the authority of the Ministry of Education and Teaching. I do know, however, that the competent ministries of our two countries have cooperated in many programs, and there are discussions also of other programs in the future. I am convinced that by considering our mutual interests the questions will be solved in the spirit of friendly relations between our countries.

[Question] Do you regard increased cooperation as possible in film art and in respect to actor and director exchanges and co-productions?

[Answer] There are already fruitful relations between the two countries in film art, including archives. Cooperation in co-production based on mutual interests, for example, could be developed further. In respect to the exchange of actors, however, although we do not categorically exclude the possibility, there are certain problems, more exactly objective difficulties. Some of our actors cannot be absent for an extended time. The outstanding film actors are also the best theatrical artists, the main performers in the theater. No doubt you will agree with me that the public goes to the theater mostly to see the greatest actors. Also, our new economic-financial mechanism places increased tasks on our theaters in respect to their financial self-sufficiency. Under such circumstances it is impossible to suspend performances. According to the indications, therefore, it will be most convenient to develop cooperation in respect to stage management (as this is already customary for the theater).

[Question] The periodicals of the socialist cultural and educational council are KORUNK, HET and MUVELODES. How do you judge their work?

[Answer] We have many socio-cultural periodicals, including those that appear in nationality languages. The ones you mention reflect the "We Sing of Thee, Romania" national festival, which is participated in by millions of workers without nationality differences. In their columns they give information on and discuss in a broad and useful manner Romania's socio-cultural life, and the development trends in the culture and art of the Hungarian nationality. With their own means they contribute to the implementation of the Romanian Communist Party's policy, the flowering of Hungarian nationality intellectual life, and the building of a socialist culture in Romania—a common, specific culture for the whole of Romanian

society. We regard the activity of the newspapers as good and useful, and they receive all necessary support.

[Question] Please speak of the general trends in the changes of Romanian cultural life.

[Answer] The cultural life of our country is built naturally into the general process of the building of socialism, it reflects the great transformations characteristic of the society, the changes which are taking place in people's mode of thinking and consciousness in the great, dynamic revolutionary process. As in all areas of life, the basic effort in culture is directed toward a new quality of higher order, and we have to find this quality, realize and implement it. Our party and its secretary general, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, has set this goal for all our economic, social, political and cultural activity. By making profitable use of our traditions and the values we have created thus far, we want to develop a culture worthy of present-day requirements, and without false modesty we can claim that the artistic and intellectual people of our country agree with this effort, consistently adapt themselves to it and create esteemed works of art in every area of cultural life.

[Question] Like Hungary, Romania does not find itself in an easy economic situation. What is the strategy of culture under these more narrow material possibilities?

[Answer] I am not familiar in detail with the problems about Hungary's present situation to which the question refers. If there are such problems, I am sure they will be solved by the efforts of the Hungarian workers. Naturally, I shall touch on the kind of timely questions that occupy us in Romania. Since 23 August 1944, and particularly in the past 20 years, we have achieved striking results. Although your newspaper is of a cultural nature, I shall turn with your permission to the frequently eloquent language of numbers. Our industrial production has increased by 53 times; as compared to 1950 the production of our agriculture has increased by four times; the living standards of the workers and education, science, art and culture have moved in a radically positive direction. All this is the fruit of our party's policy and the combined effort of all the workers following the Romanian Communist Party with confidence and without nationality differentiation. Cheerleader optimism, of course, does not benefit anyone, and it is not a characteristic of our party. If the material and human resources had been better used and if certain errors and weaknesses had not manifested themselves, the results would be at an even higher level. Moreover, it must also be said that since our development is not autarkic, Romania has also felt, in practice, certain negative consequences in recent years of the global economic crisis. As the secretary general of our party recently emphasized, we have all the conditions for carrying out steadfastly the goals set in the present 5-year plan of the party's 12th Congress and of assuring Romania's continued resolute progress on the road to creating an intricately developed socialist society. Since we have set this as our goal, socialist Romania will soon join the ranks of countries with a medium developed economy. Proceeding from this, the 13th Congress of the Romanian

Communist Party to be held this year will set new, higher goals for the econo-social development of our country. At any rate, culture—as a phenomenon—has never developed in isolation from a country's economy or its econo-social life. The history of world culture affords innumerable examples of this. In Romania, too, there is a close relationship between culture and the development of econo-social life. On the basis of results achieved thus far and the efforts directed by the party and state to assure a vigorous intellectual blossoming of Romanian society, no particular problems have emerged in regard to culture. Whatever culture needs for its development is available to it. Therefore, in this area the strategy continues to be built on substantive problems, it bears in mind how culture helps in the formation of the workers, particularly the young, at the present level of our society's requirements in harmony with universal human knowledge. Of course, this does not mean that we need not economize with the money designed for culture and use it in the most efficient way possible.

[Question] With all the official discussions we know that there was little time for sightseeing in the country and the cities and to attend performances. But still let us ask, with what impressions do you depart from our country? What message would you leave, what would you say to our readers?

[Answer] It is true that the conference left us little time to familiarize ourselves with your beautiful country and its cultural life. In previous visits, however, I learned about many things, including your theatrical life. As vice-chairman of the joint committee of Romanian-Hungarian cultural cooperation I have traveled in Hungary; I have had the opportunity to visit cities and cultural institutions outside of Budapest, and these impressed me greatly. I was happy to become familar with the interesting, beautiful, old and new architecture in Budapest and other cities and with the activity bearing witness to marvelous outstanding professionalism at your cultural art institutions. I depart with good, pleasant impressions and sincere, friendly feelings. Please give my best wishes to writers, artists, workers in culture and the readers of your newspaper.

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CSO: 2500/416

EXPANDING TIES WITH FRG PRAISED, VALUED

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 21 Jun 84 p 6

[Article by Sandor Gyori: "We Live in Europe Together--Signposts From the FRG"]

[Text] He pronounced it Budapest, with an "sh," the young man from Munich and seeing my mild surprise, he added without hesitation: "With so many of our people going to Hungary these days, you should not be surprised."

He revealed that he plans to become an astronomer and, inciting my curiosity further, he related that in the course of his studies he came across the name of a 15th century German astronomer, Regiomontanus, who also worked on Hungarian soil for some length of time as a guest of the bishop, Janos Vitez. "After all, a thousand years of history is binding us together here, in Central Europe"—he summed up his brief report.

Logic Dictates It

While spending a few days in Bonn I repeatedly recalled the discussion of several years ago. Especially since it turned out that the boy from Munich is not at all an isolated case, many others in the FRG also pronounce Budapest with an "sh." What could hardly happen in other, more distant corners of the Western world seems to be natural in Bonn: one does not meet the gray, impenetrable wall of obscurity.

Maybe it should be charged to this being my first visit to Bonn, nevertheless, I was surprised by the embarrassingly precise and uppto-date information a representative of the CDU had about Hungary. There was a note of frank appreciation in his words (and also in the words ofhothers) of the intellectual and human openness of the Hungarians, as he put it: "of the cool-headed, realistic policy of Budapest." He also added: "We have to be mutually calculable which presupposes our mutual knowledge of the other and the maintenance of comprehensive relations. We consider indispensable a dialogue with every European country, of course, also with Hungary."

Chancellor Kohl summed up his views on the subject as follows: "The two basic principles of our policy have never been secret. We are a solid and important European member of NATO and are committed to the Common Market. But no sign of equality can be placed between the Common Market and Europe. Europe is more

than that! There also are Western countries which are not members of this organization and, of course, East Europe including Budapest also is part of Europe. It would be stupidity to state it otherwise."

In the course of the Bonn discussions, like a red thread ran through an idea, the demand expressed in words that European coexistence has a fate-reversing, future-determining role. I am again quoting one of our partners: "Logic dictates it since Europe, the old continent divided into social and military systems, is indivisible in one respect. Namely, that the changes in the relations of the opponents have their stake not in victory and not in defeat but in the avoidance of the nuclear holocaust."

Somewhat arbitrarily, I summed up in two parts the elements in which the questioners and the repliers were in unconditional agreement:

- 1. It is in the interest of both Hungary and the FRG to reestablish the international thaw. The possibility for it exists and a normal, regulated Hungarian-West German system of relations can contribute in a positive sense to the global process of relaxation of tension.
- 2. It is the hope and need to both countries that not only the more relaxed atmospher of the early 1970's but, with it, a more favorable world market climate should also return.

According to Chancellor Kohl, "Because of the distance of several thousand kilometers, the U.S. policy with respect to the European countries is understandably different from that of Bonn. We consider Hungary and Poland our neighbors if not in the narrow geographical then in the historical sense of the word. One cannot pass over the geopolitical circumstances. We have to accept the fact that Hungary belongs to another alliance system but this does not exclude sensible cooperation."

At the Limit of Possibilities?

An objective form of appearance of the relaxation is the healthy economic cooperation which—and they concur in Bonn—cannot be degraded to a small—time attendant of or—if you wish—a weapon of politics. If I have said that Hungary is rather well known in the political spheres of Bonn, this can be felt at least as much and maybe even more forcefully in the world of economic experts. Particularly enlightening to the writer of these lines was the assertive and unequivocal wording according to which the FRG is interested in developing the existing economic relations with Hungary and that, in spite of the often sharp differences, Hungary and the FRG are bound by the character—istic, high degree of export sensitivity, the dependence on the world economy which appears and has its effect in different ways but can be equally demonstrated.

One of the experts of the German Chamber of Industry and Trade remarked half jokingly and half in earnest: "Our exchange of goods will approach the upper limit of possibilities before long."

Of course, there is no level which could not be exceeded but it is a fact that the FRG is the most important Western trade partner of our country and, in the reverse, Hungary is at a not negligible second place behind the Soviet Union on the list of Eastern relations of the FRG—the GDR is handled separately. But it also is part of providing a sense of the order of magnitude to note that the CEMA nations enjoy only five percent (!) of the FRG's commercial trade.

Nevertheless, the people here are repeatedly stressing the need for expanded relations and also their wish for it not tout of faked courtesy. It has become a recurring slogan that the FRG is one of the world's largest commercial nations today. They want to sell, but to do so, they also have to buy both in the figurative and concrete sense of the word. And here come the often definitive differences since the conditions reigning on the FRG market—and this was not shoved under the rug by our discussion partners in Bonn—are extremely stringent because of the very strong competition. I heard that "those wanting to sell their goods here either must produce good quality or must offer a bargain price."

The coin also has another, less shiny side, however. The fact is, we cannot ignore the restrictive Common Market regulations which make it difficult to put even our internationally competitive goods on the FRG market. In the interest of veracity I must state that this was acknowledged by every discussion partner in Bonn from the lowest to the highest level. Moreover, several of them promised that they will speak in our behalf to the Common Market authorities.

In spite of all its peculiarities, both parties are satisfied with the cooperation and its extent; mainly with the several hundreds of cooperative agreement. After all, the experiences indicate that the cooperations are much less sensitive to global economic recession than are other solutions and forms.

The Augsburg Example

Of course, the relations between the FRG and Hungary are not limited to the political and economic spheres. The cultural relations are also being expanded. The FRG Culture Week was organized in Budapest early this year. Indeed, the significant trends of the literature, art and culture of the FRG are present in the everyday life of the Hungarians. Suddenly, I would not even know where to start the list of examples to prove it. Just like in politics and economy, there are also small and large matters in culture. As a final accord, let me mention one of the less spectacular "small relations." The organ of the Pancratius Church in Augsburg was made by a Hungarian firm. The boxes enclosing the mechanism were made of oak, the blow pipes were made of tin and lead alloys, the biggest of them being 6 meters tall and weighing 300 kilograms. At the time, the organ was first played by the chairman of the Organ Department of the Music Academy of Budapest. Because of the battle fought there by the raiding Hungarians, Augsburg is still being vividly recalled by Hungarians interested in history. With the organ of the Pancratius Church, perhaps this "small link" will also bring us closer to equilibrium.

2473

CSO: 2500/414

MORE ON CHURCH AFFAIRS SECRETARY MIKLOS TV INTERVIEW

International Contact, Religious Orders

Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 29 Apr 84 p 6

[Interview with Church Affairs Secretary Imre Miklos: "Answers to Questions Omitted from the Program"; this is a continuation of the TV interview of 26 April which was translated in the 30 April East European DAILY REPORT pp F9-F14. Additional questions have also been translated in the 12 June 84 JPRS EPS-84-076 under the title "Religious Training, Education Facts Supplied."]

[Text] In our issue today we begin responding to questions omitted, due to lack of time, from the television program called Sixty-Six dealing with Hungarian church policy and the position of the churches. We will return to the theme and the questions from time to time in the future issues of our paper.

[Question] What kind of international contact do the Hungarian churches have? (Mrs Tibor Molnar, 9700 Szombathely, Korosi Csoma Street 68.)

[Answer] The contact of Hungarian churches and denominations with international church centers and with churches of other countries is extensive and systematic. The prestige of our churches is great abroad, chiefly because their fundamental standpoint on various questions is clear and simple, because they participate on a theologically high level in international churchlife, and because they have proven that without abandoning their articles of faith it is possible to function as a church in a socialist society and assist in the prosperity of the fatherland and humanity. A sign of this recognition is, for example, that foreign students like to study at theological seminaries which operate in Hungary (for instance, at the Budapest institute for rabbinical studies, rabbis are trained for the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union). Likewise, Hungarian divinity students and others preparing for ecclesiastical careers study at foreign theological colleges and universities, for example, at the Papal Hungarian Ecclesiastical Institute, or at French, U.S. universities, colleges, etc. Representatives of Hungarian churches are present on the elected board of directors of diverse, international ecclesiastical organizations: among others, the

World Council of Churches, the European Conference of Churches, the Lutheran World Alliance, the Christian Peace Conference and the Berlin Conference of Christians.

[Question] Are there religious orders for men and women in our country, and if so, what are they concerned with? (Imre Gimes, 7100 Szekszard, Rakoczi Street 84.)

[Answer] In Hungary, four religious orders are active; four colleges for boys and two colleges for girls belong among their schools. They maintain six secondary schools for boys and two for girls. The schools of the St. Benedictine order operate in Pannonhalma and Gyor. The school of the benevolent teaching order (Piarist) is in Budapest and Kecskemet. A Franciscan provincial institute can be found in Szentendre and Esztergom. The school sisters named after Our Lady maintain a school in Budapest and in Debrecen. These enumerated religious orders continue their instructional activity on the basis of an agreement entered into with the state in 1950. Every Hungarian citizen who meets the given schools' admission requirements can be admitted to the ecclesiastical schools. This also applies to the Reformed and Jewish secondary school.

[Question] Quite a few asked: how did the financial situation of the Hungarian churches develop, and what do they subsist on?

[Answer] There are several components of the material resources of the Hungarian churches. On the one hand, voluntary contribution of church members, or rather the sums paid for individual church services. The state has no report on the magnitude of this sum, since the churches themselves obtain and use this. A second important source is the so-called state aid, which the government grants yearly to the value of 74 million forints. The overwhelming part of this is so-called personal state aid paid out to clergymen. Outside of this, the Hungarian state offers assistance for the upkeep and renovation of church buildings and for the protection of monuments. The state considers these a part of the national wealth, and bestows the same kind of treatment on them as on monuments in the possession of the state.

Besides all this, individual churches receive foreign support; this reaches the churches via the Hungarian National Bank with consideration being given to the daily exchange rates prevalent at all times. The sum of this is variable; in general it may be put at 1 1/2 to 2 million dollars annually.

It follows from all this that the old, compulsory church tax, collected as a public tax, has disappeared, as well as the income which the churches obtained through their estates and their other undertakings. After their earnings given in detail above, the churches do not pay taxes.

[Question] Does the agreement between the state and the churches extend to the so-called free, i.e., small churches? (Mrs Jozsef Guttray, 1157 Budapest, Hevesi Gy. Street 33.)

[Answer] Yes. Although our state did not enter into such agreements with the small churches as it did with the large Hungarian churches, it acts in the spirit of these agreements in practical contact with them.

[Question] What kind of possibilities do the churches get for creation of contact with endangered youths? (Laszlo Simon, 2220 Vecses, Petofi S. Street 14/a.)

[Answer] Concern for endangered youths forms part of the churches' charitable activity. In the recent past, for example, the Ecumenical Council of Hungarian Churches created a committee named the Ecumenical Mission for Neglected Youths, a committee which concerns itself with their lot in an organized way. The Reformed and the Lutheran Churches' committee for the rescue of alcoholics also displays significant activity. The church newspapers are likewise actively concerned with this theme.

(We will continue with the response to questions.)

Church and State Relationship

Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 13 May 84 p 6

[Interview with Imre Miklos, chairman of the State Office of Church Affairs: "Dialogue, Freedom of Religion"]

[Text] We continue with the answers of Imre Miklos, chairman of the State Office of Church Affairs, to questions omitted from the program.

[Question] To what extent does the State Office of Church Affairs influence the life of the churches in each important question, and, in general, what is the office's task? (Csaba Moricz, 4552 Napkor, Kossuth Street 50.)

[Answer] It is not the task of the office to influence the churches' life or to decide what standpoint they should assume in this or that matter. Governmental regulation 33/1959 (VI.2.) concerning implementation of statutory decree No. 25 in 1959 clearly defines the tasks of the State Office of Church Affairs. According to this, falling within our scope of duties are: implementation of pacts and agreements entered into with the churches and religious denominations, payment of state subsidies—in general, management of personal and material affairs in connection with state support—preparation of church—related rules of law and assurance of their implementation, management of questions connected with the free practice of religion and with freedom of conscience, assurance of the uninterrupted course of church functions, and the management of church affairs dealing with trusts and property rights.

It clearly follows from all this that the AEH [State Office of Church Affairs] is a state office, just like any ministry or supreme authority of a ministerial nature. Thus, clergymen do not work here, but rather colleagues who provide the party's national policy and church policy. Our task, our daily work

is to settle questions which arise through discussions with the churches. In past decades a partnerlike relationship has developed between leaders of the office and the churches. This does not mean, of course, that we have no problems, that there is no dispute between us, but fortunately the political situation in our country has long been such that we can settle each question through discussions.

[Question] Does the dialogue between church and state, between religious idealism and materialism continue, and at what stage is it currently? Are there differences in the relationship of the state and the various denominations? (Gyorgy Ferenczi, 5430 Tiszafoldvar, Nyul Street 10a.)

[Answer] The relationship between church and state developed over a long course requiring mutual efforts. The results were born when we applied the teachings of Marxism-Leninism to our particular Hungarian conditions, and the churches—some sooner, some later—also were able to recognize the changed conditions and, sticking to their articles of faith, perform their work under the new circumstances of a changed world while keeping in view their own interests and those of the entire society. On the basis of our experiences up until now I can assert that this form of relationship between the churches and socialist state has worked well.

The dialogue between Marxists and religious persons has historical perspectives. In this continuous dialogue the Marxists and our religious partners focus our attention primarily on the domestic and international questions and tasks before us. In addition to the questions of peace, progress, disarmament, strengthening of national unity and the prosperity of the citizens of our country, the dialogue has special fields—for example, the sphere of ethical questions—in which believers and Marxist scholars pursue fruitful collaboration.

As far as the second part of the question is concernerd, there are no first-class, second-class or third-class churches in our coutry. It follows from the principles of the socialist state that no distinction is made between individual denominations; after all—no matter how strange it sounds, but it is true—denominational equality is realized in the socialist society—guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, in practice, for instance, the Baptists, who possess a few thousand believers, participate on an equal footing with the Roman Catholic Church.

[Question] Several letter writers raised the question: are discussions continuing between the Hungarian government and the Vatican concerning establishment of diplomatic relations?

[Answer] I can answer that by saying that the question of diplomatic relations between our country and the Vatican is not currently the order of the day. In the field of connections between states the significance of diplomatic relations is truly great, although experience shows that the existence in itself of diplomatic relations does not necessarily mean normal relations. A very successfully operating system of contacts—it has contributed to the development of the accomplishments of the past

twenty years—has already existed for two decades between the Vatican and the Hungarian government. It is a general rule that both parties concerned thoroughly examine in advance the question of creation of diplomatic relations, and make a decision in the light of these experiences. As a point of interest, I might add to all this that diplomatic relations between the United States and the Vatican were established only this year—two hundred years after the United States came into being.

[Question] Why is a believer not qualified today for leadership? (Andras Juhasz, 2600 Va, Domnay Street 3.)

[Answer] The person who formulates the question is presumably misinformed. In Hungary--with the exception, naturally, of party functions--religious persons can occupy any kind of post or function, and do so.

[Question] There is freedom of religion in our country. The Jehovah's Witnesses spread propaganda and pester people everywhere. What is your opinion of this? (Mrs Laszlo Kurucz, 6600 Szentes, Marx Square building.)

[Answer] Freedom of religion is part of freedom of conscience. Freedom of conscience means, among other things, that it is possible for some to be religious, and it is possible for some not to be religious. However, freedom of conscience does not mean that, with reference to this, people are pestered, viewpoints are disseminated and actions are taken on behalf of something which violates the moral standards of society.

At the conclusion of the answers to the questions, allow me a more general observation. In the half a thousand letters which arrived at the program, the questioners touched upon 149 themes altogether. In very many letters there appeared, sometimes in a more tactful, sometimes in a more immoderate phrasing: why does a socialist state proclaiming a scientific world view accept as its partner the churches which proclaim a different ideology? Since these questions bear witness to a lack of understanding of the essence of our national policy, let me in answer quote an excerpt of a speech of Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, given at the conference of active party workers in Budapest in February of 1976:

"...The churches are without exception loyal to our system; they accept socialism as the goal and the program of the country's people...They, too, live in the socialist society. But while working for revolutionary goals, we must unite with strength, ready for all cooperation. One can say about this: this is a compromise. It is possible, of course, to call it that. We learned from Lenin—and we represent this, too—that every compromise which promotes our revolutionary cause is acceptable; only the compromise which damages the cause of revolution is unacceptable. This is not conceptual/ideological concession but rather political cooperation carried out in the interest of definite political goals. If we live in such a mixed society of materialists and nonmaterialists, then this is the way we will build up socialism; only let it be built as quickly as possible, as firmly as possible, and let us advance as soon as possible..."

12327

CSO: 2500/407

SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT, FOREIGN INTERFERENCE DISCUSSED

AU280815 Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish May 84 pp 57-62

[Stanislaw Wronski article: "Three Stages"]

[Excerpts] The most dramatic matters are behind us, the most difficult ones ahead. This is how General Wojciech Jaruzelski briefly described the current situation in Poland while speaking at the National Conference of PZPR delegates on 18 March.

This assessment accurately reflects the view generally shared by party aktivs and also the conviction of most Poles in the light of the events of the past few years. Everyone in Poland is familiar with the subject matter contained in the above saying.

The worst is behind us—the threat of total economic collapse and civil war. The antisocialist reactionary forces which did not succeed in restoring bourgeois rule to Poland immediately after the war (at that time they even counted on a World War III) have suffered another setback.

These general facts are already known, whereas details of the opponent's plans and actions will be fully revealed and learned of in due course. On 13 December 1981 Polish soldiers erected a dam against domestic counterrevolution and protected the country against the danger of civil war and its tragic effects. This they did on the strength of a sovereign decision, based on the PPR Constitution.

After this worst period came the most difficult one, a period divided into three stages.

The first stage defined immediate goals: halting the economic collapse; breaking the fall in production and that of the national income; firmly opposing the antisocialist forces of destruction, subversion, demogogy, and anarchy; introducing self-management principles of economic reform; waging a relentless party battle against social evil, for social justice wherever this justice was violated or ignored, and for socialist democracy and socialist trade unions; and regaining the party's confidence.

All this happened in the short space of 2 years; 1982 and 1983. This was a road leading away from the precipice and leading uphill, a road full of exceptional internal and external difficulties.

However, the cold war imperialist circles in the West headed by the Reagan team did not wish to come to terms with the thwarting of their plans and with the annulment of their well-known efforts centered on the person of Walesa. Through the medium of subversive radio stations, they organized a vertible propaganda orgy using hypocritical slogans of freedom, American style. They introduced economic restrictions against Poland, dollar aid, prizes, gifts, stipends, and invitations to selected Poles for them to study abroad. They also thought of a Nobel Prize for a particularly distinguished person. The United States allocates hundreds of millions of dollars for buying over people, organizations, and governments in order to maintain world anticommunism. Anticommunism and anti-Sovietism are commodities which rank high on the stock exchanges of the capitalist world. However, these commodities quickly become spoiled and decayed.

After an unsuccessful frontal attack on socialism, the adversary chose new tactics in the form of a long march and maneuvers. We learn the details of these tactics in an interview given by a well-known specialist on Polish affairs in the United States, Zbigniew Brzezinski, to a less-known former director of Radio "Free Europe," Jan Nowak, in October last year. Nowak asks the following question: "Now let us turn to matters that are closest to our hearts: Polish matters.... In your opinion, does the current resistance movement in Poland, which foresakes violence, have any real hope in the near and far future?" Brzezinski's reply was firm: "I would say yes. The purpose—liberation. The strategy—dissolution." And further on he explains: "Only a strategy of dissolution, softening up, transforming the ruling team... infiltrating the regime is possible."

"Zbig," as Brzezinski is popularly known in the United States and who occupied the exceedingly important post of chief of the National Security Council during the Jimmy Carter presidency, has excellent knowledge of the possibilities for a strategy of dissolution, infiltration, and transformation of ruling teams. He received this knowledge from personal contacts and past acquaintanceships with prominent people in science, culture, and the press, the church, as well as public life inside and outside Poland. But life has given the thumb [pokazalo fige; a gesture of defiance made by inserting the thumb between the fingers] to "Zbig" and people like him on more than one occasion. Nevertheless, one should not ignore one's adversary. Brzezinski was the first to publicly propose that the United States recognize the Yalta Treaty, and hence the Potsdam one as well, as being invalid. For "Zbig" is a personage of universal thought and action. When asked what were his greatest achievements during his high office in the U.S. Government, he said: "It seems to me that my biggest role was bringing about a normalization of relations between America and China... relations dictated by strategic considerations," Next, he lists further achievements of his: "Restoring a military presence, above all, an American presence, in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, which includes my concrete recommendations that military facilities be established in the Port of Berbera in the Gulf of Aden, in Mombasa, and on the island of Masira near Oman." And only then does he add modestly: "Finally, I would say that I played an active part in formulating the concept and strategy of defending human rights, and that this influenced to a certain extent what has happened in Poland and elsewhere."*

^{** (}POLISH DAILY [DZIENNIK POLSKI], London, No 42 (251) of 22 October 1983: "The Situation in the World and in Poland in the Eyes of Z. Brzezinski," interview, pp 1-11)

Hence, the situation in Poland is the result of a class struggle on a domestic and international scale between the forces of imperialism and those of socialism, fought with all possible means and under the most fictitious slogans such as the "defense of human rights," a struggle fought in Grenada, Nicaragua, other countries in Central America, Indochina, and many parts of Africa. This is hypocrisy. It is visible particularly clearly today when one looks at our country.

But that is how it will be in the future. "As long as the Soviet Union has the strength of a superpower, a frontal attack... is senseless." That is Brzezinski's explanation behind the strategy of "softening up the ruling team in Poland." One cannot fail to take notice of this interview of "Zbig."

The second stage, outlining party activity for an intermediate distance in time, is no easier to achieve than the first. Halting inflation, restoring market equilibrium, making full use of existing industrial potential, and reaching the 1979 level of industrial output and national income—these are the first economic tasks of this second stage in order to fully overcome the crisis. Seven further tasks in this plan were defined by Wojciech Jaruzelski at the National PZPR Conference: Establishing party ties with the working people and consolidating the party's workers nature, plus strengthening the socialist state, plus socialist economic reforms, plus a line of wide national accord based on the principles of socialist development plus an ideological offensive and the socialist education of young people; plus progress in science, education, and culture, plus strengthening Poland's ties with the socialist countries and enhancing friendship with the Soviet Union. The sum implementation of the above tasks should guarantee a clear road leading straight to the third stage—the consolidation of socialism within Poland's entire socioeconomic system.

However, there are people who do not want the evil appearing in the daily life of factories, offices, institutions, and schools to be removed. They do not approve of calls for honest, disciplined, well organized, and efficient work and of appeals for everyone to perform his work and citizens' duty, make savings, and eliminate waste as the only way to guarantee a better today and tomorrow. Such a course does not suite them. For them this course is "old"; what they want is something "new." Maybe the kind of renewal announced and half fulfilled by the leaders of Solidarity? We remember their forecasts that Poland would be like Japan. A great obstacle to achieving the goals of the second stage is also the abundance of inertia, stagnant routineness, powerlessness, and indifference. This obstacle is the most difficult one to overcome because of its extent.

The third stage was announced in the party declaration adopted at the National Conference and entitled "What We Are Fighting For, Where We Are Heading." A A draft for a future party program will be the subject of general party discussion, after which it will be presented at the 10th congress. But already today people are thinking about how to halt the growing gap in the development of modern technology for industrial production, which is of decisive importance for the future of socialism; how to counter the great dangers of pollution and solve problems with investments, raw materials, the fuel and energy base, transportation, and housing construction; how to achieve self-sufficiency in food; how to raise health and cultural standards; and how to guarantee poeple's material situation at a level suiting the phase of developed socialism.

Each of these three stages has its own scale of difficulties, but they are interdependent. The way in which immediate tasks are performed will also be employed toward future tasks, whereas the definition of a future program no doubt influences the method of performing immediate and intermediate tasks. Hence the need for realistic and comprehensive thought and action for the sake not only of today.

It has turned out that many decades are needed to build a developed and mature socialism. The belief that it can be built more quickly has foundered because of numerous objective hitches in development caused by domestic and external factors, to say nothing of unexpected yet not unnatural obstacles.

A mature stage of socialism involves the required level of economic development and the meeting of society's material and cultural needs under conditions of socialist production relations. This stage may be reached when the general population has already reached a certain stage of social and cultural maturity. The proper approach toward public ownership and duties should be among the basic principles of socialism. Without this there can be no mature socialism.

It is not clear what these philosophers advise us to do if in these countries, which they consider unripe for socialism, the possibility has emerged to overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie. Should one wait until the country does become ripe for socialism? Or should the workers class take power in alliance with the peasants and with all progressive forces, and then proceed to carry out the work necessary to achieve mature socialism? In reality, the workers and peasants are considering the issue in their own way, without listening to the advice of philosophers telling them to wait until the apple is ripe when it will drop at their feet of its own accord.

Nevertheless, the problem of a maturing socialism remains, albeit not on the apple tree of a capitalist state, but on that of a people's state.

The problem remains the settling the numerous discrepancies in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. The problem also remains of creating the conditions leading to a higher stage of social development and to developed socialism.

The twilight of socialism has already been announced more than once, without people realizing its ability to repair itself, overcome difficulties, and gain new development strength. The building of a new system has been going on for 40 years in Poland. And no one can question the social advancement of millions of people and the greatness of the material and cultural achievements brought about by labor aimed at socialist development for the sake of the individual and the entire nation. Were it not for objective and subjective obstacles, more could have been done. But that is another subject.

We have not collapsed in the fact of mass internal hindrances and in the face of obstacles placed in our path from outside. An enormous role in overcoming these difficulties has been played by the aid given us by the fraternal socialist countries, above all, by the Soviet Union. No doubt that is how it will be in the entire continuing historical process.

It is no coincidence that the adversary has been vehemently trying to upset the friendly Polish-Soviet relations. All the ammunition from the anti-Soviet arsenal has been used; the Soviet Union has been blamed for all the plagues and misfortunes which have troubled Poland in the past and which are doing so today. Well-worn methods of fabricating lies and false ideas have been employed for this purpose, and nationalist emotions and sentiments stemming from the 19th century have been alluded to. In this blind hatred of socialism, there has been no desire to recognize one single positive fact concerning the Soviet Union's aid to Poland. Churches and pulpits have been used for anti-Soviet propaganda. Mysticism has not been absent either.

Acting under these conditions, the party has defended Poland's alliance with the Soviet Union. General Jaruzelski said in the Sejm on 21 July, 1983: "The foundation of the PPR's foreign policy has been, is, and will remain a close, invoilable, and mutually advantageous alliance with the Soviet Union. This alliance is also an expression of our sovereignty and a guarantee thereof." The truth of this remains valid for all periods in time, for the entire future.

CSO: 2600/1076

REYKOWSKI DISCUSSES SOCIAL CONFLICTS AS CAUSE OF CRISIS

Budapest ELET ES IRODALOM in Hungarian 29 Jun 84 p 7

[Interview with Janusz Reykowski, social psychologist, by Gabor Miklos; date and place not specified]

[Text] Professor Reykowski has been researching for a long time now the causes of Poland's crises and social conflicts. The highly respected scientist—member of the Academy and of the PZPR [Polish United Workers' Party]—has published various studies on the subject in the past 3 years. The writings, which appeared in POLITYKA and in TU I TERAZ, have often been sharply criticized in other organs.

[Question] According to your studies what are the socio-psychological factors in the Polish crisis situation?

[Answer] First of all, we should speak of the various views which exist in Poland regarding the causes of the social conflict. I shall discuss three views. According to the first, the economic and socio-political concepts of the preceding period were correct. The crisis was evoked by the personal errors of leadership members and foreign interference. The second I call the classical oppositionist or revisionist view; this fully rejects the socialist development of the past four decades as being nothing more than a "historical mistake," which must be abandoned and Poland must choose the West European capitalist course. According to the third view, the concept chosen at the time of the socialist revolution was the correct one; it met the requirements existing at the time, but it no longer is adequate for the conditions which have changed as a consequence of social change. This, they say, is the major cause of the crisis. Finally, this is also my point of view.

[Question] If we accept this as the general cause of the crisis, what are the psychological motifs?

[Answer] It would be important to examine how one of the basic ideas of the socialist revolution in Poland was realized, namely, social justice. It is well known that social equality and justice do not always proceed on the same path. One way of realizing justice is through extreme egalitarianism. We know to what

results this experiment led in certain countries. The application of egalitarianism restrains development. Another version would be the application of the socialist principle of distribution according to work. Thus far the practical application of this principle has always proved extremely difficult. Finally, a third version was realized. This made it possible to eliminate the extremes—wealth and poverty—and at the same time it guaranteed the general advance of the society's lower class. It offered constant growth in the material area and in cultural consumption, and increased participation in the exercise of power. All the critical moments in the past 40 years of Poland—1956, 1968, 1970 and 1980—occurred when for some reason this social progress was decelerated.

[Question] If we look at the sociological data, we see that in the early decades the mobility of society was great. What happened later on?

[Answer] The condition for this advance was economic development, the creation of higher positions at the places of work. Our data convincingly show that the process of mobility was perceptibly decelerated in the middle of the 1970's. The lack of a perspective for progress and stagnation affected more and more people. But the cause of this phenomenon was the fact that the reserves for growth were exhausted in the given socio-economic conditions. The stagnation or retrogression put a question mark on the system, the basis of which was the promise of social progress. In this situation people reacted with increasing sensitivity to manifestations of inequality. The rapid growth of wealth among some makes the majority sensitive when its own situation is becoming more difficult. And here we have arrived to one of the psychological aspects of the crisis: at the end of the 1970's the sensitivity of the masses to social justice and equality increased in the given economic situation.

[Question] This situation provides, I believe, primarily the economic background to the public sentiment.

[Answer] An extremely important dimension in the development of Polish society has been the significant change in the level of its education. In 1945 a total of 300,000 persons in the whole country were university or high school graduates. Today 5 million Poles have high school diplomas, 1.5 million have university or college degrees! But I am not thinking only of formal schooling. People are much better informed of the world. By virtue of culture and travel, aspirations have grown. The satisfaction of these efforts were not possible in a deteriorating economic situation. And it is obvious we are not speaking only of material-type efforts. Related to the increased education of society is the mass demand to increase the possibility of exercising democratic rights, or as they put it in Polish sociological literature, "subjectivity," that is, that a person should not be an object but an active subject in social action. It is a rightful demand of the people to voice themselves in matters concerning their affairs, the more educated someone is the more he is inclined to express himself in questions regarding the greater community. All these changes occurred as a result of the socialist revolution. At the same time, excessively centralized guidance remained in Polish society as it was introduced in the post-war years.

[Question] Thus only centralization was realized from the Leninist principle of centralism.

[Answer] The prevailing principle was the compulsory execution of central directives. The situation that came about in this manner has its characteristic in psychological effects: People's sense of helplessness increases, their conviction is strengthened that nothing depends on them. A harmful sociopsychological consequence of the phenomenon is that people make some kind of mythical external force--"them"--responsible for everything. The situation is stronger in consciousness than in reality. At the same time it encourages inertia. A good example of this is the store manager who answers to his customer's demand for a commodity by saying: "We don't have it because they didn't bring it!" But it can well be that he did not look into the matter at all. Such behavior becomes prevailing especially in a difficult situation. It is in this kind of situation that people say "I am not responsible, or my group, but "they" are. This can also explain the increased antipathy toward those who exercise power. When similar situations develop, the hostility of the governed toward the authorities increases. This recalls somewhat the parentchild relationship. In the final analysis the phenomenon might be called infantilization.

[Question] The youth is an important part of the Polish population. Does this represent a special problem?

[Answer] This is—relatively speaking—the most educated sub—class, and its aspirations are also the greatest. They have been affected most by the stag—nation or retrogression. In the 1970's social and official advancements became more difficult—the positions were already taken. These problems actually appeared as a consequence of the socialist revolution. The effort at social justice and at advancement both meant an effort at the fulfillment of the original promise. But there were two phenomena which stimulated the crisis in the past period. One was that economic management did not adapt to development, the system was unable to adjust to the new external and internal conditions. The other was that the political system did not develop adequately, and thus did not create the possibility of participation in political life for those social sub—classes making such efforts. It is in these asymmetries that I see one of the bases of the crisis, including also the socio—psychological conflicts.

[Question] What role did the well-known religious nature of the Poles play in the development of the crisis?

[Answer] I do not count religion as one of the causes of the crisis. At the beginning of the 1970's, for example, the strength of the church declined as is also shown by sociological studies. The church grew into an alternative idealogy after the crisis started and then deepened. The church did not cause the process, but it is the beneficiary of the phenomenon. In a word, the church would never have become such a force if the major problems which I discussed earlier had been solved correctly and in time.

[Question] Do some of the national traditions have an effect on all this?

[Answer] No doubt the traditional value system of Polish society has elements which deepened the crisis. In Poland the traditions for accepting central government are much weaker than in those states where absolutist systems existed for a longer time. In all the neighboring countries there are periods of history when strong absolutist systems existed. It is possible, therefore, in these societies they will accept more easily the operation of a centralized state power than in Poland, where centralized government was foreign. In independent Poland the government was decentralized and weak. In the 18th century the partitioning big powers were strong. This may be one factor in the deepening of the tensions, but I would put this also among the secondary factors.

[Question] Views have gained considerable circulation which look for the causes of the problems primarily elsewhere. They see the influence of foreign powers, a conspiracy of the Freemasons in the crisis.

[Answer] It is a psychological fact that people fence themselves off from negative phenomena. I and my group cannot be the cause for whatever is bad. Since people think in national categories they are frequently unable to accept that Poles are the cause of what is happening to them. Here the bad is identified with non-Poles. In the Middle Ages a similar role was played by witches, they represented the bad one could be blamed for all the problems.

[Question] As a psychologist and at the same time a socially and politically active intellectual, how do you see the possibility for confidence rebuilding in Poland, that is, the reduction of the psychological consequences of the crisis? As we see it, the political passions are cooling off and sooner or later the economy will get on the right track.

[Answer] Confidence is an attitude which builds very slowly. Once it comes to an end it is very difficult to restore. In the 1970's, particularly at the beginning, the Poles were confident that they could make progress relatively rapidly, and advance materially. This development was accompanied with various hopes and expectations. As a consequence of the economic effects of the crisis, all this came dramatically to an end. In a number of respects the retrogression in the economic area is 10 years old. Thus it is understandable that anyone who was disappointed in this way should lack confidence. It is also clear that his passions are directed against those who "took away what they gave." And here follows another problem. The present leadership must regain the confidence which their predecessors lost. Meanwhile, the government must preserve continuity, it cannot say that it merely inherited a situation. No matter what kind of policy it follows, it must answer to the population for the errors of the past period. Therefore, despite the declared policy, the lack of confidence will not be eliminated. I believe that a consistent implementation of party resolutions may lead to the ending of the crisis of confidence.

[Question] That is to say, the creation and consolidation of such political institutions as will meet the population's aspirations and put an end to the present division between those who exercise power and those who are deprived of power?

[Answer] All this means that people should feel responsibility for their producer enterprises, for the destiny of the political institutions, and know that their work counts in the decision-making.

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PARTY MISFORTUNES RECALLED

Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish No 5, May 84 pp 84-93

[Article by Janusz Fastyn: "The Intangible...."*; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface in the original source]

[Text] The shadow of Solidarity still lingers over the local issues here. To be sure, it can be metaphorically said that the higher the sun of socialist renewal rises, the shorter this shadow becomes, but it does exist. And its existence is revealed not so much in the so-called spectacular manifestations evident from time to time in some squib, little underground newspaper, demagogic utterance of some member of a worker council or an isolated attempt to work at a "snail's pace," as in people themselves. It manifests itself in their feelings, attitudes and views on the surrounding world. People have not yet completely picked up the normal thread of their lives. Their mental condition could be compared to that of a hangover. They had become intoxicated by words about "freedom and democracy" as well as by the action itself that was to translate these words into reality, but which actually led to chaos and anarchy and was to their own disadvantage. Now they are holding their aching heads in their hands. Some ponder ways of finding themselves back in real life. Others persist in senseless apathy. A few try to reverse the current in the Vistula with a stick.

From the conversations I had at the Bialystok Factory of Instruments and Clamps (called Clamps in short) I learned about facts and events which—I hope—when put together will depict a mosaic close to the "real" picture. I am bracketing "real" in quotation marks, because the truth of this picture will be partial, largely contingent on the subjective appraisals of those I talked with as well as on my own mind—set. I will not conceal that I am principally interested in the party, in the condition of the plant's party organization and the feelings of its members. This in its turn predetermines that we will travel not only on the rough surface of measurable and tangible matters but also in less tangible regions by, among other things, listening to "the secret chords" in the individual's soul.

^{*[&}quot;Intangible" ('Nieuchwytny' or 'non-clamping') is a play an words--see text]

Taking a Count of How Many of Us Are Here

The plant party organization has in the last 3 years seen its membership shrink nearly in half, from 637 members and candidate members in mid-1980 to 353 in early 1984. Nowadays no one is any longer shocked by such figures, although they certainly provide plenty of food for thought. Those leaving the party were those who should have left it or rather should in general not have joined the party at all. They are referred to as accidental, indifferent, passive people. Sometimes they also are referred to as careerists, and much more rarely, as alien and hostile [elements]. In general, this decline in membership was natural, as a reaction to an unnatural increase in membership during the preceding period when the greatly needed deliberation and ideological selection were supplanted with importunate recruitment. In several or perhaps 15 cases--and these are concern chiefly blue-collar workers [at Clamps] with longtime party seniority--the departures were accompanied by sorrow and bitterness. But as for the others, they are not to be regretted. They did not give anything of themselves to the party and merely waited for the party to give them something. The growing tree shed its dead branches. Is that bad for the tree?

I am thus not surprised that Mikolaj Parfieniuk, the first secretary of the plant party committee, discusses this topic in a rather light and relatively unconcerned manner. The past is dead. It is a different issue that causes his young face to become grave: not the problem of size of membership but the problem of the quality of party ranks. He is disturbed by the fact that the plant party organization does not have enough workers among its members. The proportion of workers among party members is 43 percent, although their proportion in the entire workforce of several thousands at the plant is more than 65 percent. For while such proportions might be pleasing for the country as a whole (because the proportion of workers in the national party membership is 39 percent), in an industrial plant--and a predominantly male-staffed metalworking plant at that -- they provide cause for wonder. Especially because quality also is at issue here. It is customary to speak somewhat panegyrically of workers. Once one is a worker, he is a model for a statue. Yet workers, like other social classes, are individuals of varying quality. Some are less mature, others more. Their character, attitudes, moral values, etc. differ. The party secretary is concerned about having in the party the best and most valuable representatives of the working class as well as productively active technicians and engineers. It matters to him that the principal yardstick of belonging to the working class be not only the outward appearance: a blackened face and spotted overalls. Yet unfortunately the local party organization also includes "comrades-workers" who are all thumbs at work and do not stain their collars with sweat. It is a shame to admit it, but recently one such fellow got soused while at work and, when the management penalized him, he began to demonstrate his "party-mindedness" by trying to blackmail the plant party committee into restoring his bonus as otherwise he would surrender his party card. The party secretary settled the matter by answering: "We ourselves want it back."

Mikolaj Parfieniuk belongs to the new generation of party secretaries. He is 32 years old and has completed advanced studies in economics at Gdansk

University. He is energetic and quick and has a realistic outlook. He is a fairly recent employee of Clamps, having moved there in (the spring of) 1980 from the PKP [Polish State Railroads] to the post of chief specialist for worker affairs. In November 1982 the plant party committee plenum elected him first secretary. He was re-elected to this post by the recent reports-elections conference. Thus, as party secretary he is young both in age and in seniority. But—as can be readily seen—he is well—accepted. Perhaps because he does not spare himself at work and is hard and demanding. Toward others and toward himself. In this respect the previous party secretaries had been not all alike.

Parfieniuk knows what he wants. Above all, he wants to put an end to the decay that characterized the plant party organization in the last few years. One must begin with the basics: count how many of us are in the party, state our concerns, take specific measures. And this is being done. Membership records and dues are being brought into order, talks [with individual party members] are conducted, plans are being made and meetings are held. As recently as a year ago, hardly any of the plant's ten basic party organizations (POPs) held meetings, and if they succeeded in holding a meeting at all, the attendance was low and silence reigned. Now POP meetings are held more regularly, attendance is far from worst and party members speak up increasingly often and increasingly loudly.

This is still not enough to trumpet fanfares, but it is enough not to feel melancholy and despair.

I asked, although I knew that the answer could not be unequivocal: "Those 350-odd party members are after all a sizable contingent. On how many of them could you depend if a difficult, dramatic situation arises?" And again, as so often before, in 1956 and 1970, I longed to hear the answer, "On all!" There is some idealism in this, yet without this soupcon of lofty dreams the activities of communists would be devoid of any meaning. We must be maximalists in face of popular attitudes. We must speak of our membership in an atmosphere of tension and unremitting concern for fostering the beauty of mankind and eliminating evil and baseness. We must stubbornly strive to reach a time when, in reply to the question, "On how many can you count?" the secretary of the party organization will declare: "On each and all." Even though we are only human and sometimes one finds it difficult to answer whether one can count on oneself.

I shall never forget an utterance made by Wladyslaw Gomolka in 1957. He said that if the party only had half as many members but aware and militant ones boundlessly devoted to the cause of socialism, then the deepest sea of difficulties would reach only to our knees instead of reaching our throats.

"Do you remember?" He cannot remember, because in 1957 he was only 5 years old. But he is familiar with Wieslaw's text and, like myself, he believes that the book "O naszej partii" [On Our Party] should be reissued and read. It contains many valuable thoughts about the party that remain topical nowadays as well. It is a pity that, while he had pointed to the right road, Gomulka himself did not proceed on it completely. Prior to December 1970 the party's

membership grew in an uncontrolled manner; it was like that before 1956 and worse still before 1980. These were the most explicit signals preceding each party crisis. Let us hope that this pattern will not repeat itself. But if this hope is not to be futile, "safeguards" are needed. The most important safeguard is a serious attitude toward party membership.

I have the impression that the comrades at Clamps at present approach this issue with the entire gravity it warrants. The painful experiences of recent years have left a deep scar. They still recall (as reflected in a report presented at the recent reports-elections conference) the lighthearted and bombastic atmosphere of the 1979 plant party conference: /"Our accomplishments in party work demonstrate that we have chosen the right road. This growth rate of party membership, as recorded during the recent term of office, is unprecedented in the annals of the plant. Thus while in 1978 we admitted 133 new comrades to the party, during the first three quarters of this years as many as 115 comrades joined the party at our plant, and this is not the last word."/

They recall even more clearly the events that followed shortly: The demonstrative flinging of party cards, the sudden replacement of slogans about socialism with anti-socialist demagoguery, the conversion of atheists into fanatical clericals and ordinary vagabonds into leaders of strikes and protests. Some of them were precisely the new party members admitted in the 1970s.

So now every new applicant to party membership is carefully and thoroughly scrutinized and the requirements posed toward party members themselves are being increased and made more specific. This necessity was stressed during individual talks conducted with every party member on the initiative of the plant party committee. It began with the payment of dues arrears and attendance of party meetings. Who knows, perhaps some tardy members will have yet to be bidden farewell for these prosaic reasons. The tasks of the party comrade in the community and the duty of working to improve oneself are being enunciated with increasing clarity. Again, after years, the primer of party work is being introduced. The times of fiction and make-believe are ending.

But these beginnings are a difficult and sensitive process. We do not want to direct it too abruptly and hasten it, because we are dealing not with a soulless mass but with living individuals. This is illustrated clearly by the case of a young worker narrated to me by a POP secretary.

At a POP meeting that comrade rose and asked to be deleted from the membership roster. Reason? His wife does not allow it! Laughter in the room. Then the faces grow gloomy. After all, they know him. He did not let the party down during the most difficult period. He is a good worker and comrade. But now he has become prey to this weakness? He describes his family situation, which is becoming intolerable. His wife and mother-in-law attack him, threaten divorce. But he loves his wife and, above all, his two children. He cannot imagine parting with them. He asks the comrades for help. He feels bound to the party and will try to attend its meetings and act in such a manner as to stay in it, and he promises that he will return to the party as soon as his

family problems get resolved. A long discussion follows. His wish is granted in an atmosphere of understanding, and he is promised that the road back is open to him.

I admit that I find it difficult to assess this event. At first glance the interpretation is fairly simple. A weak male who cannot resist aggressive females. A milquetoast type and probably a philistine to whom a welcoming home and hearth matter above all. To be sure, he somehow linked his life to the party, but that link was so slender that the first sharp domestic conflict could disrupt it. He demonstrated lack of ideological toughness and force of conviction. He submitted to the pressure of the petty-bourgeois and clerical milieu. He preferred the peace of the domestic hearth to the lofty ideals of the revolution, progress, and the rebuilding of society for which others sacrificed their lives.

These are strong and just arguments, but... they seem a little inhuman, as it were. It is one thing when this concerns a professional revolutionary, say, a modern-day Pavka Korchagin. But Korchagins do not grow on every hedge. Besides, where can they be found nowadays? It is another thing when we are dealing with an ordinary run-of-the-mill worker, a 33 years old grinding machine operator with basic vocational training who reads newspapers cursorily and attends both party training courses and the Sunday mass, and who is generally convinced of the justice of socialism but does not completely grasp its subtleties. His life is arranged along the line from the factory to home and back, and his feelings for his home are somewhat deeper. As a human being he finds "self-fulfillment" both here and there. Both are of equal weight to his life. His home protects him against the stresses and anxieties he experiences at the factory, while the factory protects him against becoming "enslaved" to his family. The contradiction exists and it even has recently acquired the form of a dramatic conflict, but still it does not lead to a fundamental choice of values. If he were asked to choose between the party and his family, he would not understand the question. The party to him means his fellow work comrades and not some abstract idea. And it is precisely to them that he turned for help at a difficult moment in his life.

This event can be variously interpreted. For example, as a manifestation of liberalism by the plant party organization, which failed to brand the worker as an "ideals-lacking comrade" and did not "cut itself off" from him in an atmosphere of loud words about the class struggle, submission to foreign influences, etc. Of a certainty, the subject is not exhausted by the comment of the first secretary of the POP: /"He acted honestly toward the party. Hence, we continue to consider him one of us. We will help him in his struggle against his own weakness. This is more difficult than writing him off as an 'alien' [element]."/

Shame as a Factor in Progress

Clamps is a child of socialist industrialization. Before the war there was no metal industry in Bialystok. But the proletariat was there. There were several private workshops and little factories housed in sheds open to the wind. One of them, and perhaps the largest, employing 120 workers, was A. Gotlib's

foundry at 3 Lakowa Street. It is precisely on its site that there now stands a large modern plant employing several thousand people and manufacturing precision instruments for machine tools—the Factory of Instruments and Clamps.

It did not rise from nothing, unlike so many other factories erected during the period of the 6-Year Plan. An asset of Clamps was the fact that the core of its workforce consisted of skilled and experienced prewar workers, specialists with "golden hands," toughened in class struggles. It was they who taught job skills and the proper attitude toward work and public property to the rural and urban youth which gravitated en masse toward industry in the early 1950s. Larceny and drunkenness were inconceivable at that factory. The firm principles of worker ethics were in dominance, supported by a strong feeling of dignity, of "the worker's honor."

Austere customs, crystal-clear probity and industriousness still survive in many of the worker families which systematically replenish the plant's workforce, with sons replacing fathers. There also exist whole families which work at the plant, such as the Buraczewskis, the Kudraszows, the Solowiejs and others. One can encounter the father, the son, the daughter and the son-in-law working at neighboring workstations. There also are many whom the factory had raised, who began as boys by learning a trade and today are excellent specialists—brigade leaders, foremen, engineers.

It is they who represent the "salt" or core of the workforce and create a climate of good work—not by words but by deeds, by their advanced skills, discipline and industry. Their greatest value is that they know how to work and want to work. If the plant has throughout all these years remained at a high level, won interplant competitions and was awarded challenge banners and certificates of commendation—it was owing to these people. And it was solely owing to them that in the recent period the plant did not experience problems or disintegration, although the margin for that was narrow. After all, these people are in the minority and the tenor of plant life is increasingly imposed by the representatives of the "demographic peak"—febrile youths wearing worker overalls or second—rate intelligentsia.

It is precisely this threat that I discussed with the party aktiv group—chiefly workers—representing various generations. The youngest, 24-year-old Eugeniusz Siemieniuk, a lathe operator in the repair department, is at the same time first secretary of his POP and chairperson of the ZSMP [Union of Socialist Polish Youth] circle. This is a rare instance of combining both functions, but judging from the energy and enthusiasm of the bearer of these functions—it is a successful one. He begins the conversation with the somewhat boastful declaration that he did not join Solidarity in its time even though many party members (following persuasion by the plant party committee as well) did join it. And at once he explains why: /"The most militant Solidarity activists in my department were those who used to lick the boots of the management. And they still lick them now."/

The oldest (reaching 60) is Jan Sobolewski, a former frontline soldier, a technician-mechanic who is a white-collar worker but does not cease to feel a

blue-collar one. It was he, as acting first secretary of the plant party committee, who had tried in 1981 to save the party organization from collapsing. At the plant party conference on the eve of the 9th Congress he was the speaker who warned against the danger of anarchy encroaching upon the life of the state and the plant. He spoke out in opposition to the negation of everything and disdain of own accomplishments. Showing a courage unusual for those days, he condemned the strikes, declaring, among other things, that: /"The view, 'I don't work so that things would get better' is unacceptable. For whom would that get better? Certainly not for Poles!"/

Mikolaj Rakowski belongs to the middle generation. It can be said that he was born here in Clamps and grew up together with it. He came to the factory when he was 15 and has been working in it to this very day. He knows everyone among the production personnel and is knowledgeable about every nut and bolt-nothing can surprise him or be concealed from him. He has learned several different skills; among other things, he used to be a painter and a lathe operator. In 1973, while keeping his job, he completed a mechanics technicum in his spare time. Trade-union activity has been his passion. He had a serious attitude toward the old trade union of metal workers and was its chairman for the production department of the plant as a whole, and for this reason he had frequent clashes with the management, and with the plant party organization as well. It was for this reason, among others, that he joined the party fairly late, in 1976. His own comment is: /"I joined the party late, because as a trade unionist I was at loggerheads with the party aktiv. I joined in order to change things in this enterprise, since this would be impossible without the party."/ And he has been trying to change things in his present capacity as the volunteer organizational secretary of the plant party committee.

Others with whom I spoke included the 29-year-old electrician Stanislaw Korzynski, first secretary of POP No 10, who was elected member of the Executive Board of the Province PZPR Committee at the recent province conference, as well as the 49-year-old Teodor Chomienia, leader of a quality control brigade, who has for the last 20 years been secretary of the largest basic party organization, POP No 1, at the production department. There also were other comrades--space does not permit naming them all--with whom I spoke or whose opinions I was able to hear at the party meeting, and whose views and moods I am recording here to some extent.

There is something intangible. It is neither sorrow nor shame nor anger. This something holds together intimately these party activists and plunges them into a kind of melancholy. They still have not completely absolved themselves of their own weakness, which is the weakness of their entire party: to put it plainly, their blood still grows hot when they recall those days in 1980 and particularly in 1981 when the plant party organization practically ceased to exist as a coherent force, despite their own wishes and actions. It disintegrated before their very eyes, submitting to the spell of hollow words, words completely alien, outsider words that had nothing in common with their work life.

Slogans, myths, spasms. A new ideology in the form of babbling shouts emanated from loudspeakers, posters, leaflets and writings. People listened, read, repeated. Minds grew more confused, the state of collective hypnosis deepened. Instead of work, joint songs and prayers. We'll strike and force the government to stock fuller store shelves. If farmers strike together with us, there will be more ham and butter. If children strike in schools, the level of education and upbringing will rise. Surrealism was introduced into politics as a completely valid and "credible" element. The greatest idiocies were accepted as revealed truths. The cretinous concept of "the second Japan" was treated quite seriously even by persons with a well-developed sense of humor.

With one hand they babbled into the ears of people and with the other they were soberly preparing jump-off places and bridgeheads to make the leap to power. The regional headquarters of Solidarity moved to the factory and almost completely dominated it. The white flag with the red inscription waved over the factory gate. Walls were plastered with posters and wall newspapers. A high-power loudspeaker buzzed the entire city district, hurling sheaves of insults at the party and the authorities. In front of the factory gate stood stout-shouldered young men with white-and-red brassards. The management and all the services of the factory were subordinated to Solidarity. The plant party committee also was to a large extent dominated by Solidarity.

The party conference on the eve of the 9th Congress (in April 1981) became a kind of antiparty meeting. The presidium chairman was Marczuk (chairman of the plant Solidarity and at the same time chief of the MKZ [Interfactory (Solidarity) Founding Committee]) and most of the participants in the discussion spoke for his benefit. The speakers vied in attacking their own party and lauding Solidarity. They advocated developing the "Forum of Party Thought" (this being the name of the local "horizontal structure") and supporting Stefan Bratkowski on the grounds that /"the letter of Stefan Bratkowski reflects the opinions of the basic party organizations and is not harmful."/ Nearly all of the participants in that discussion are at present no longer in the party and some are even active in the "Underground."

How could it happen? This question is still current. It evokes feelings of shame or rather anger at ourselves. Becaue there is a kind of shame that represents anger turned against oneself. It is a good and salutary kind of shame. I recall once reading a sentence by Karl Marx on the revolutionary force of shame. In a letter to Ruge, he wrote: /"You look at me smilingly and ask: What's the use of it? Shame is not turned into a revolution. My answer is: Shame already is a revolution....Were an entire nation genuinely to feel ashamed, it would be like a lion tensing itself for a leap."/

Hence the party's—I think mainly of its worker aktiv—entire hope rests in that it experiences the feeling of that shame, which is neither the shame felt by well brought—up misses nor the painful shame of chest—thumping sinners but the healthy shame felt by angered workers. It is themselves that they see as the culprits. They perceive the principal causes of the evil injuring the party to lie in their own mistakes, although they are aware that they could place the blame on the mistakes of the top party leadership, on propaganda, on

the weakness of social sciences, etc. Of course, these factors are important, but it is they, the factory worker activists, who are responsible for the condition of the party at the factory. And it is they who must change this condition themselves. The primary issue is—they say—"the defective expansion of party membership," just as they would say "defective production" or "a defective casting." The meaning is clear.

The paramount issue to ponder is the "confusion of the minds," that is, the question of ideological activity, of learning Marxism, understanding socialism (many people believe that socialism means catching up with and emulating capitalism by the less developed countries), waging the struggle for the minds and hearts of the people. Our greatest weakness was our inability to wage the struggle, our unpreparedness for sharp, violent disputes and discussions and the more so for ruthless attacks and raucous assaults. After all, we had been taught for years that there was absence of contradictions and presence of moral-political unity in our society. When the avalanche of rumors, calumnies, persuasions and lies, mingled with criticism of authentic mistakes, descended on us, we were traumatized. We failed to wage the struggle. We knew neither how to speak eloquently nor how to shout. We merely parroted hackneyed phrases which no one wanted to hear anymore. We were simply outshouted, in an adroit and skillful manner at that.

We have not learned how to produce such propaganda. Even now this is not our strong point. For example, the underground SMOLUCH now and then appears in our plant. This is not even a little newspaper, certainly because its publishers no longer have the needed funds, but rather a single sheet of paper recording all sorts of foolishness. Most often, it contains anticommunist slogans and personal attacks against so-called collaborators. Are we to rely on the Security Service alone in this matter? The plant radio station is inoperative, the factory newspaper RYTM PRACY has not been reactivated, and the party propaganda center is inactive. Could not we at least publish some 'COUNTER-SMOLUCH,' some "news flash" or leaflet in which we would, in simple and sharp language, unmask the activities of our adversaries and explain our attitude? We still do not know how to wage political struggle.

As for our training—God have pity on it [as published]—is it to continue to consist in nudging people toward the auditorium so that they would listen to some wise but dull lecturer who should speak on TV instead of coming to the plant? We must study Marxism, the basic principles of societal development, the theory of the revolution and the class struggle, the principles of ethics and political economics, but we should do this in small study groups through active discussion and self-education. There are among us comrades who graduated from the WUML [Evening University of Marxism—Leninism] or higher educational institutions, and the "teaching faculty" could be selected from among them. They could guide the self-education groups, select appropriate books, find articles in periodicals and steer discussion. But the road toward knowledge must be a personal road, based on personal reading and reflections. If only some party members could grow in this way, open their minds to the fresh wind, the party's ideological revival would become immediately obvious.

This view was propounded to me by one of the comrades. He is not the only one to hold it, but so far a different view has been prevalent at the plant party committee. Namely, it has been claimed that the plant lacks the resources for conducting [Marxist] training at the proper level. Certainly, one should study, especially the "Marxist multiplication table," without which any discussion of the "higher mathematics" is pointless, but this should be done with the aid of professionals imported from the Bialystok institutions of higher education, from the army, from the Province PZPR Committee lecturer staff, and, best of all, from Warsaw—so that the lecturer would impress the audience by his personality or name.

Discussion of this topic still continues, and it is hard to say which view will prevail. As for the "training" itself, it occurs sporadically and is uninteresting. The audiences doze, just as uncut brochures issued by the Information Department of the Central Committee doze on shelves at the plant party committee.

Crossing the Frontier

Is it possible to speak of the leading, guiding and whatever else role of the party at this enterprise, considering that the plant party organization lacks any major influence on the planning and organization of production, working conditions and the staffing of key posts? Yet this precisely was the situation toward the end of the 1970s under the reign of Director Kosma. The plant party organization waged a resolute struggle over the principal issues at the factory, but lost it, which was subsequently, after August 1980, to affect its condition very painfully.

The dissension within the plant party organization began precisely with the loss of support from the workforce, which felt sorely let down by the defeat of its "guide." Had the party aktiv emerged the victor in the battle with the unpopular director, to the satisfaction of the blue-collar workforce, Solidarity would never have succeeded in gaining such a tremendous influence. What the party had failed to accomplish, Solidarity accomplished several months later. With one blow it swept out the director. Thereby it gained boundless trust.

It is difficult to understand why the higher party echelons could not support at the time the just struggle of the plant community for its basic rights. Over two years (1978-1979) there had been growing acute and increasingly specific criticism of irregularities in the factory's management by the autocratic director. Arbitrariness and mistaken decisions touching sensitive issues were evident to the naked eye.

There was no party meeting at which no mention was made of poor management, profligacy, extravagance, improper attitude toward subordinates, suppression of criticism, etc. The matters went so far that a vote of no confidence in the management was taken and made public. Early in 1980 the executive board of the plant party committee voted an official resolution expressing disapprobation of the director. The preamble of that resolution contained, among other things, the following accusations:

- --erroneous personnel policies (removal of experts);
- --forced crediting of uncompleted products to finished products;
- --wasteful materials management, faulty repairs;
- --disregard of the postulates and recommendations of the workforce.

The text of that resolution, which culminated with the recommendation that the director be recalled, was transmitted to Province PZPR Committee and the PONAR Association. Not a hair fell from the director's head, but the plant party committee secretary received a sharp reprimand from his party superiors.

This matter is now history and perhaps it is not worth mentioning were it not for the effect it has produced on the contemporary situation. Among the factory management, despite the changes that took place in it, there has remained a kind of grudge against party proposals, recommendations and initiatives. It is believed that the plant party committee still suffers from the "management complex" while the management is readily found to suffer from the "plant party committee complex." One fact that is certain is that representatives of the managerial collective are reluctant to attend party meetings and conference. It is alleged that the most frequent attendee of party meetings is the one deputy director who happens to be a non-party member.

During the martial law era disregard of the factory community has become a norm—a new and fairly readily accepted custom at the factory. All decisions are made at the top. Discussions, bargaining, consultations are unnecessary. This saves hassle and is convenient. Certain comrades from the factory management are eager to maintain this norm at present as well, failing to perceive that, after all, the party organization is reviving, the new trade unions are becoming increasingly active, and the worker council does not consist of mere figureheads. Even the fishermen's club wants to be treated as a "partner," at least as regards certain issues, especially considering that it has a membership of more than 400 fellows.

Gradually, what was broken is getting glued together. Time does its work—it simply advances and pulls people along. Those who stay behind, cease to count. Of a certainty, by now there are few determined stragglers left. But one question that still remain open concerns the activism of that largest part of the workforce which, to be sure, does perform its basic job duties but still does not fall into line with the vanguard. It does not feel itself to have a weighty voice on many new issues in the factory's life, e.g. those relating to the economic reform. It is more a client than a partner.

No one but the party organization can help the "silent majority" to cross that intangible frontier between the status of the "hired worker" and the position of a conscious co-boss of the plant. The party aktiv is clearly aware of it. But it also is aware that this is not a matter of just a single step. This is a difficult and delicate process.

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EFFECTS OF IDEOLOGY, PROPAGANDA EVALUATED

Ideology, Politics, Propaganda

Warsaw TU I TERAZ in Polish No 11, 14 Mar 84 pp 1,2

[Article by Stanislaw Kwiatkowski: "On the Question of 'What Next?'"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface in the original source]

[Text] /More and more questions: What next? Which priority? How is day-by-day practice related to ideological premises? These days, who is gaining and who losing? What are we fighting for? Whither are we going?/

Assessments of the present and questions about the future may be many and varied. The answers will be many and varied. Marxists, thinking of the future, will above all analyze present-day sociopolitical realities and deduce from them the directions of action and the hierarchy of values. Social progress, the movement forward, requires exploring properly just what has happened and what is happening nowadays, what are the configurations of forces and class interests and what is the situation of discrete classes and social strata. In a word, a complete picture of the social reality is needed if one wants to change and transform it in the desired directions, correct or intensify the growing trends.

However, as far back as I can recall, we have always had more to say of the future, of what is to happen, than of the present situation. For years, in our ideological work we have been discoursing enthusiastically about the future, spinning promising visions, describing what we would like to happen, what we are dreaming of—but invariably at the same time knowing inadequately about what we have, about our resources, about what we can count on and what could obstruct us.

How much has been written about the society of the near and far future, but just consider: what do we know about present-day Poles? We do know that there are nearly 37 million of us, with women outnumbering men. We know how many live in cities and how many in the countryside. Figures also are available on education and employment in subsectors and work establishments. There also are some statistics on blue-collar workers, peasants and white-collar workers, and perhaps also on the intelligentsia. Sociologists would, moreover, have some

not too definite data (e.g., that one-third of "respondents" opt in favor of something, as many are against it, and the remainder have no opinion).

Even if something can be determined as regards the state of the awareness of workers or peasants, that is, of the most important classes, what do these nineteenth-century categories mean? After all, the material situation and social position of different members of the same worker or peasant class varies greatly. A farmer who tills two hectares of sandy soil views life differently from the owner of two hectares of hothouses. As for workers, they are divided into those who barely make ends meet, vegetating from one payday till another, and the worker aristocracy with earnings of several dozen thousand zlotys monthly. And what about the intelligentsia? Who are they anyway? What is its status and how numerous is it? Recently an entire conference at the IPPMIL [Institute of the Basic Problems of Marxism-Leninism] was devoted to this topic but did not clear it up much.

Does such a picture of the reality suffice for the class policy of the socialist state? What do we in general know about this society, which we want to guide and direct? The propagandist pronouncements of most activists are generally characterized by such a high degree of abstraction that they are rather expressions of a world outlook, of wishful thinking.

Ideological texts lacking social analyses and unsupported by a competent analysis of the reality cannot be suitable for practical action. Theory becomes reality according to need. Thus, it should be deduced from the actual life of the working class, from the modern realities, from the desires and aspirations of workers. The developing situation can be controlled only on condition that sufficient quantitative data on the situation of discrete classes and social strata are available. Such accurate data are lacking.

I thus react with anxiety to those party speakers and publicists who, when formulating their assessments and postulates of the reality and their visions of the future, demonstrate an oversimplified understanding of the premises of theory and of our system of society. They discourse about the future as if they had known the details of what would happen and how. They refer to classics [of Marxism-Leninism] as if these were textbooks of social engineering, looking for algorithms of action, model solutions, ready-made designs for building socialism. It is precisely they that are the loudest in appealing for a "return to the sources" and for respecting "Leninist norms."

If such a return is to be made, it should be a return to dialectical, creative thinking of the reality as well as to action in accordance with the changing new socioeconomic conditions and political realities. As known, it was precisely Lenin who condemned most sharply any stereotyped, schematic thinking. One should, like that great man, declare honestly: /"We have not yet created anything complete; we still do not know the kind of socialism that could be completely contained within paragraphs"/ (Vol 27, p 539).

By turning unwarranted appraisals into revealed truths and demanding that some imaginary behasts be respected, food for arguments is provided to adversaries. Lenin warned against treating socialism as a "painted icon." Bending life to

make it fit something foreordained once and for all, dogmatizing Lenin's contributions in the bureaucratic works of the theoreticians of biblical "Marxism," demonstrates that the same weaknesses and misconceptions still persist.

Before we can begin to reach an accord with others, let us reach an accord among ourselves. The more so considering that another extreme pervades social awareness and manifests itself in publicistics: those who—opposing the omniscient ones as "dogmatists"—put forward their own concepts of farreaching elemental solutions. This refers to the proponents of social Darwinism, of ultraliberal market mechanisms, who espouse the slogan: "let the wiser and stronger man win" and then it will be easier for everybody and the [economic] crisis will pass away sooner. This entire philosophy reduces to the claim that the poor and dumb ones come last and are paired.

A detailed prediction of the future is hardly to be expected, and at most that would be a political horoscope. Yet such demands also are being heard under the pressure of these expectations in connection with the discussion of the program declaration of the PZPR: even literary ideological outpourings of this kind have appeared. If this goes on, that would already be the third stage of the creative writing of ideological science fiction. Once in the 1950s the road to socialism had been painted in rainbow hues as far as the horizon line with its rising sun of communism. Then came the time to settle accounts with the socialism already developed in Poland. It is thus nothing surprising in that those ill-disposed toward Marxism have begun to speak of it as of something praiseworthy but unrealistic and utopian. They rejected those "models" of socialism as alien, unsuitable to Polish conditions. As if it were possible to speak of or practice Marxism while at the same time disregarding social, and hence also national, conditions [distinctiveness].

In this connection, I must admit that I am amazed to hear and read the outraged comments defending the universal features of socialism, expressed in polemics with the advocates of national conditions [national distinctiveness]. Suffice it to peruse Lenin's "Philosophical Notebooks" in order to ascertain /"that what is universal indeed exists only in what is particular. Hence the conclusion that a social movement cannot be understood if life is bent to fit a system of concepts that are set down once and for all."/

Whence the "escape to the future" in ideological work? Whence the propagation of what things should be like and the asseveration that they must become so? The primary cause appears to be the doctrinaire teaching of Marxism at higher educational institutions and within the system of advanced party training. So far, this teaching, which still is based on a stance dating from the period of the hasty and oversimplified indoctrination of the early 1950s, has failed to offer what is indispensable to the Marxist outlook on the world and social relations, namely, the science of dialectical thinking, the methodology of altering the reality in accordance with the interests of workers. To teach Marxism means to provide the foundations for the way of thinking proper to it, to inculcate the custom of employing it as a tool. This would be critical and, in principle, open thinking. Openness and criticism are inseparable principles of Marxism.

As Engels said, /"Marx's entire concept is not a doctrine but a method. The concept provides not ready-made dogmas but the premises for further study--as well as the methods of that study" (Marx, K. and Engels, F., "Pis'ma o kapitale" [Writings on Capital], Moscow, 1968, p 575).

In my estimation, /the decline of principled Marxist theoretical thinking will be difficult to reverse/. This produces painful consequences to our entire political life. (Theory functions in isolation from practice, and ends are independent of means.) The effects on the party's ideological activity are particularly shocking. Ideology is reduced to /"a system of aims, values and norms, as well as of views on the life of the society, created in the experience of people by work and codified by the party."/ Thus, it is not surprising that the activism of a substantial part of professional ideologists has so far been most measurable in publications dealing with mature socialism and morality, that is, with what should be.

/The propaganda of success was not the brainchild of journalists; it was a consequence of such a view of ideological premises./ As known, relations among ideology, politics and propaganda are direct and obvious. For this very reason the mass media had been trumpeting with such enthusiasm the praise of lofty values, noble norms and models while at the same time glossing over the complications of practice—the contradictions of class interests, the situation of the working class and other classes and social strata. Politicians proclaimed assurances of moral-political unity and gave promises of catching up with and overtaking developed capitalism so that "people would live in affluence." The propaganda convinced that this should be so, ignoring the realities. The official, biblical "Marxism" served as a bait, a decoration concealing the reality.

Ideological work is meaningful if it sticks to facts and deals with issues having a direct bearing on people, their lives, their needs and problems. Man learns most rapidly what he experiences himself or sees happen to others as an example. Often this means learning from mistakes. /The party's mistakes so far are the principal present-day source of information for outlining the directions of action in the future. Awareness of these experiences must be constantly present in the ideological and political thinking of the leadership and rank-and-file members of the party./

I do not want to tire the reader with quotations, but many pertinent quotations can be found in the classics [of Marxism-Leninism]. Lenin directly wrote that the new society is /"an abstraction which can only be translated into reality by a number of varied, imperfect attempts at creating this socialist state or that"/ (Vol 27, p 351).

Is it worthwhile to lean on visions, on a model to be realized? Is it worthwhile getting excited over what is to be? We need a real [popular] movement, instead of common visionariness, to alter the present situation. The future can be neither prejudged nor programmed in detail. The future happens as a consequence of the historical process, which we can influence solely by outlining directions and making norms more precise. Social

progress does not happen in accordance with some preconceived scenario, and building the future does not mean merely translating into reality earlier projects. Socialism is not a technical or architectural project; it is not erected like a building, i.e. in accordance with blueprints. This simply does not work in politics, in work with people.

In our ideological and propaganda activities we—unfortunately—are again reverting, and this time for good, to the philosophy of the years past. We play the wise man, we instruct, as if we knew everything and, inspired by a sacred mission, arranged socialism for people in Poland. There is no such thing as a "handbook for building socialism." And such scientists who would know how to build it now in Poland also are non-existent. It is worth declaring this loudly and honestly, and even more so when scientists rather than workers are in power. Although we asseverate with such conviction the claim that "it won't happen again"—there were and will be no guarantees of it. Chances do exist for minimizing the possibility of collisions and for a smooth negotiation of curves. I perceive one such chance to exist in a thorough analysis of the mistakes made so far and in drawing the ensuing lessons. True, the mistakes are a great onus, but with such a ballast it is so much easier to overcome skidding. Skids will happen but, as car drivers say, let them be controlled skids.

Another chance for not letting "power" lead astray is afforded by closeness to the people. If /"socialism is a cause of the popular masses"/ (Lenin), it has to be built not for the people but with the people. Their comments on that building should be listened to attentively. But people comment differently, because they differ. It is impossible for the "status quo" to satisfy everyone, particularly those desirous of a chance to build something different nearby for themselves. This too has to be taken into consideration.

There already exist many institutions and possibilities for assuring regular contact with the society and specializing in defining and identifying the suggestions made to the authorities and the authors [i.e. social groups] of these suggestions. The main thing is that this advice be utilized and its authors publicized. This is of an educational nature to both sides—to the political leadership and the society. For then it is known better how the citizens differ and what are their interests, and whether superficial or not depending on the issue, and why. This by then would be accomplished in a class—oriented, party—minded and Marxist manner. Then it would not be worthwhile to utter banalities about justice, democracy and a couple of other beautiful and lofty socialist principles. The need is to keep one's feet on the ground, discuss the realities, help understand the actual situation and show what would be worthwhile doing so that the outcome would be as expected.

An honest description of the contemporaneity serves to outline the prospects for the processes currently under way and facilitates the answer to the question of "What next?" The trouble begins when less and less is being said about what had happened and is over, the present is being trumpeted self-admiringly and the most raucous noise is being made about the gladsome future.

Nowadays people analyze the present situation somehow reluctantly; this can even be perceived from public opinion surveys. A psychological explanation can be provided for this problem. But what is logical when applied to particular individuals cannot be justified in propaganda and ideological work. In the domain of awareness-shaping such penetrating analyses may not be avoided. Assessments of our own practice, and particularly of the past events as well as of the current policies, reflect important ideological questions and define more precisely a hierarchy of values, a socialist axiology. Willy-nilly, we enter upon the field of ideological struggle, that is, we skirmish with the adversary, or we retreat defeated. In practice this means that unless we ourselves spell out the realities in accord with popular experience—others will spell them out for us, on imposing their own interpretation.

Journalists, Propaganda, Politics

Warsaw PRASA POLSKA in Polish No 6, Jun 84 pp 30-32

[Article by Stanislaw Kwiatkowski: "Journalists--Propagana--Politics"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface in the original)

[Text] /"The modern Polish journalist--what is he like and what should his socially desirable model be like?"/ Excuse me, but I would prefer to answer this question with some other questions, and first: "Polish journalist," who is that? "Desirable model," desirable to whom? I fear that my being so contrary might be misconceived. Whenever I have to comment on the subject of journalists--propaganda--politics, I deliberately simplify the matter by bringing it from the clouds down to earth. For this I am resented by many "beautiful souls."

The formulation of many accusations and propositions concerning journalism and propaganda is no new phenomenon; these accusations and propositions are being considered by the society, and journalists themselves speak about themselves and their profession. This has been occasioned by a number of factors relating to the disbanding of the SDP [Association of Polish Journalists] and the establishment of a new organization. Now we are experiencing a reversion, as it were, to the not so ancient polemics by journalists about journalism. Another occasion for this has been provided by the invitation from the editors to participate in the discussion.

Assessing the journalists of the 1970s was simpler than evaluating the period between August [1980, the rise of Solidarity] and December [1981, martial law declared] in the Polish calendar. For that decade, the publicists of the propaganda of success rapidly admitted their own culpability. The Extraordinary Congress of SDP Delegates was held, along with general meetings of local branches as well as numerous meetings between journalists and, among others, the leadership, plus weekly gatherings within the association. On the occasion, people accused each other of various things and whenever possible shoved the blame onto the former state and party authorities, as if making up for their previous excess of zeal. The finale of these discussions was the professional vetting of editors. Unfortunately, the loquacious discussants could not reach any better accord than that at the time.

Journalists could not emerge unscathed from such a great crisis. There is a certain pattern to this, namely, whenever they negotiate a new turn of the road all those previously active in propaganda lose their balance. It is natural that whatever concerns the authorities and politics affects the propaganda directly, and hence also it affects journalists. I would like to say more on the subject of this relationship, obvious as it is, because it is being somewhat embarrassedly concealed, although to be sure this is understandable in such social situations. Knowing about the "power of the press" and that "whoever controls the press controls power" makes it difficult to accept a situation in which the press loses its power.

There is no need to conceal—and what for, besides?—that, throughout the world, the institutions employing journalists are in an obvious manner dependent on politicians and represent their propaganda trumpet. Journalists, like the entire propaganda, play a subservient role toward ideology and politics. It is difficult to be a journalist and at the same time stay away from politics, stand aside.

During the tumultuous period of 1981, some people even demanded making journalists, that is, professional propagandists, independent; they thought that the press, radio and television should, following the pattern of other organizations, exercise some autonomous political role. At the time, like now, many issues had to be explained from the ground up, and childish questions had to be answered (this is a criterion of the effectiveness of propaganda). The situation has changed but warped opinions have remained. It is simply difficult to believe in purity of intentions when such proposals are made by a journalist himself.

Once, during a Ph. D. seminar at Warsaw University, someone reproached me for needlessly distinguishing between socialist propaganda and bourgeois propaganda, because propaganda is propaganda, just as bread is bread regardless of which country it is baked in and from what flour; like a knife, for example, propaganda may serve various aims—good or bad. It is simply an instrument, a means, used by people. I recall that discussion; how many times it is necessary to explain that there is no such propaganda in general, no propaganda divorced from its content, political content, because the subject matter of propaganda is political problems relating to the exercise of power, and its content shows whom the propagandist supports and which values and norms he acknowledges. Even the very fact of choosing one kind of information over the other, politically "neutral" as it might be, is ultimately not insignificant. In the modern world, entangled in contradictions and conflicts as it is, most of the editorial information has a political meaning and is ideologically oriented.

In this profession one must always declare himself for this side or that—either, or. And one must be prepared for the consequences ensuing therefrom. Of course, I am oversimplifying the many-hued reality and focusing only on black and white. It is readily observed that, for example, different [local] party newspapers bearing the same proletarian slogan ["Proletaries of all countries, unite"] are sometimes quite distinctive and reflect different

editorial policies. But this does not vitiate the basic fact that a journalist must adapt himself to a publication's policy if he wants to be published. Of course, he has the right to insist on his own text:it is "autonomous" as regards explicit views and opinions, since he always has the chance to change jobs and move to another newspaper to which his convictions are more suited.

The requirement of "party-mindedness" in journalism is of a certainty easier to explain to the "sacredly outraged" proponents of the "free" press by citing a comment made by John Paul II to the Italian Federation of Catholic Weeklies (on 2 December 1983):

/"The distinguishing adjective 'Catholic' immeasurably enriches and elevates your mission. Since the weekly is Catholic, its author also is Catholic; and it is precisely owing to this title that your work represents an authentic and proper apostolate and, let me say so, a generous chaplaincy"/ (KIERUNKI, No 3, 1984).

After all, willy-nilly, a journalist has to take certain positions on issues. His activities and informational-persuasional performance are intended to organize the behavior of the society round current problems. For the journalist it is a professional passion to participate in public issues and influence the attitudes and views of others by proposing and promoting the acceptance of some or other point of view. Journalists, like the entire propaganda, cannot be uncommitted and apolitical.

Examples of the above are easy to find in the press, radio and television on any geographic latitude, and they even are directly discussed. For example, if we are to believe Patrick Sery of the French L'EXPRESS (1 November 1980) and our Polish FORUM (No 47, 1980), in the French press /"the principal place is given to international politics. The most unrestrained condemnations of Jimmy Carter or Pol Pot can be published. But as for French politics, it is reduced to a minimum, reduced to theatrical and demagogic duels between political leaders. It is vain to look for any social analysis. This is a triumph of non-commitment. The French magazine KWESTIA NA CZASIE [?ACTUEL] devotes most of its reports, well-prepared as they often are, to other countries. Other favorite subjects are science, medicine The latest fad is obesity. But despite all this, there are fewer fat people than unemployed people in France. For the last 40 months not a single program was devoted to unemployment.... When the price index is favorable, the minister of the economy is invited to make a comment. When it is bad, a brief news item is enough. On the other hand, an extensive report on inflation in the FRG is published."/

In socialist propaganda a special role should be played by /party journalists/; they constitute the ideological frontline. Their task, like, besides, that of party propaganda in general, is to popularize ideology in accessible language, to build the party's authority, to expound its intentions, to gain social support for its program, to explain national and world issues to the society, to shape activist attitudes, to organize ideologically desirable behavior, to propagate and defend socialist values and ideals, to criticize negative phenomena and to combat adversary views.

The PZPR's propaganda was and is a function of its program. The purpose of this propaganda is to organize the movement of thought, concepts and propositions. Writers, party members, are expected to comment not so much on what is happening but why. What is the alignment of the class forces? What is the situation of the working class against the background of other classes and social strata? They are required to understand the premises of party and government policies, transmit the directives of the authorities to "the grassroots," and collect proposals addressed to "the top." They are tribunes who transmit the opinions of working people, and in particular they are expected to signalize about phenomena that hamper joint efforts as well as about instances of violations of the regulations in force.

The above relationships, along with this /political partisanship/ and conditioning of journalist work, produce their own moral consequences—these are questions of attitude, conviction, professional ethics. Much in this creative work depends on moral qualifications: the choice of topic, evaluation, attitude toward people and issues, etc. In this profession, the following factors are as important as mastery of the sum total of professional skills and knowledge: political insight, a personal point of view, personal committment to the cause, an aware attitude toward happenings, and journalistic interests and passion. This does not concern merely private and abstract matters of no bearing on the selection and reporting of information on facts. Discoursing on the impartiality of journalists can ensue only from ignorance or deliberate deceit.

From its very outset and in every successive stage of his professional activities, the journalist's work has a moral meaning; in the course of gathering materials, in the approach to the treatment of the /selected/ topic, in the effort to reach the mind and feelings of the readership, audience or viewers, and in the consistent completion of the case. All the time, moral choices are necessary (topic, purpose, setting, heroes and their eventual foes, etc.), reflecting the journalist's attitude toward others and toward the event or occurrence. He submits to the court of public opinion various matters; provokes discussion, urges disapproval or encourages emulation, attempts to correct moods and feelings; helps people to become aware of their own emotional reactions, needs, social roles, aims in life, norms of behavior, etc., and demonstrates them against the background of social experience and ideological values.

Another consequence of the aforementioned relationships between propaganda-ideology and politics is all the irregularities ensuing from an incorrectly functioning political system. Propaganda, that co-dependent element of that system, sooner or later becomes infected by the disease suffered by the entire organism. Suffice it to trace the circumstances that led from the euphoria of success to total negation, from the propaganda of success and complacency to the propaganda of disaster. I wrote about this at one time in the monthly WOJSKO LUDOWE as well as in ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI.

We have learned the hard way that the party journalist should have the freedom to voice his views. I am in favor of a definite settlement of this question.

The party-mindedness of publicistics should not connote the identity of views of the publicist with the resolutions of the party echelons. The journalist is close to politics and power, but the mantle of power does not cover him and it is not to be expected that his articles would echo [party] reports. The uniformity and seeming unanimity of the press have already caused sufficient harm, thus revealing that in time they become turned against the social interests as well as against those holding power, whom they isolate from the reality. /"He who demands of the journalist that he be merely a kind of sound amplifier, has learned little from the lessons of the late 1970s"/ (Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski at the Congress of the Democratic Party of the PRL).

Apparently, a reminder must be made about something dating from the times of Solidarity, for example, the resolution of the basic party organization at TRYBUNA LUDU (No 123, 1981), in which party journalists expressed their attitude toward renewal within the party and in the country's life: /"We reject the previous model of propaganda and information-guidance, which was substructed on a deep mistrust of the leadership toward the party masses and the society—a model that depended on the particular group of individuals exercising power.... The guiding line of publicistics is the supreme interests of the nation and the socialist state. [While] we guide ourselves by the party program, we admit the presentation of any views accommodated within the framework of that program. Publicistics must be aggressive, i.e. it should deal with all problems of the party and the country, and particularly the important ones. Discussion of positive phenomena should overshadow neither at present nor in the future critical analyses of the reality, inclusive of analyses of policies of the authorities at all levels. A publicistics that deals with the attitudes of people must be independent of whatever rank they occupy."/

In general, what has always happened was that the shape of the propaganda, inclusive of the fate of publicistics, was decided by the politicians themselves. By conviction they were red, but in professional expertise, green. Green is supposedly the color of hope. But they were hopeless.

Later the situation became reversed: the power over propaganda was taken over by the journalists themselves. And we found ourselves up against another wall: from politically subservient propaganda (that of success) we switched to the politically senseless propaganda of negation.

The present practice seems to point to an exaggerated respect for politics. Or perhaps journalists have already completely become politicians?

But as for propaganda, it has continued to be ever the same. There was not and is not any clear concept (strategy), and there are shortages of trained personnel, handbooks, time, etc., etc. On the other hand, habits, expectations and persons who continually remain sure of themselves—sure of what things should be like, and basta!—are not in short supply.

To be sure, there are the government communiques, the activities of the Government Spokesman and the Government Press Office, and not much more. Safe circumlocutions, monotonous tedium, uncritical partisanship, isolation from

the facts of the reality, the "feeling of responsibility for words"—a feeling so exaggerated as to be irresponsible. The matters go so far that a single newspaper may publish four interviews and talks in just one of its issues. Any party publicistics practiced with emotional commitment is evaluated as "controversial," i.e. ideologically suspect, in servile analyses. Is not this ridiculous?

How many hypotheses have been conceived about, for example, the subject matter and style of my writings, their ulterior motives and the identity of those behind them—without considering the most elementary possibility that I am simply writing as I think and counting on a discussion.

Without an exchange of thoughts it is not possible to break through the entanglement and move forward. Yet in reality, the murmurs arising among our own [party membership] ranks, instead of ideological discussions, still continue to be of the kind of, "Why are such articles tolerated?" As in the ancient past, in the 1950s, "resistance is offered." As formerly, epithets and arguments "ad personam," that is, irrelevant ones, are doled out order to "settle the hash" of the renegade, bury him, bespatter him with mud.

I happen to know that neither the propaganda of success nor the propaganda of disaster was conceived by journalists. I will not repeat here my recent article in TU I TERAZ (No 11, 1984), "On the Question of 'What Next?'" What is certain is that if propaganda still continues to be somehow ailing, this is a symptom of our continuing fever in ideological and political matters.

1386 CSO: 2600/1090

SOCIALISM, CHRISTIANITY TERMED COMPATIBLE

AU031431 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 30 Jun/1 Jul 84 p 2

[Wojciech Kubicki commentary: "Christians in Socialism"]

[Text] It was not theory, but life which demonstrated that people who have different world outlooks, beliefs, or those who profess to have none—do not have to find themselves at opposing political poles. What is more, despite their world outlook differences, cooperation is possible for the sake of implementing goals that are deemed to be supreme and worth implementing. This was demonstrated not only in the practical experiences of Poland, but of many countries, primarily socialist ones. However, it is worth being conscious of the pioneer—like steps that Poland made on this road, steps that were initiated by the first accord between the PPR Government and the Episcopate, which was signed in 1950.

Socialist Poland needs honest cooperation between believers and nonbelievers, and Marxists and people with fideistic world outlooks now as much as it did in past decades and perhaps to a greater degree than it did in the past.

At the national conference of the Chirstian Social Association that was dedicated to the problems of Christians in Socialism—Experiences and Prospects which was organized on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the PPR [and opened on 29 June], the participants rightly drew attention to today's urgent need for cooperation. In a country like Poland that has, on the one hand, such a great tradition of tolerance and, on the other, of the love of liberty—it surely is and will be possible to have honest cooperation for the sake of the further deomcratization of the country's relations, in the name of morality and social justice, as well as the cultural and material progress of the entire nation, and, above all—of peace.

Experience has shown us that world outlook differences do not have to stand in the way and do sometimes even enrich and bring diverse incentives for us to work for a good cause, because pure intentions and honest work are really important, as are universally accepted values that are independent of differences in world outlooks.

CSO: 2600/1074

PARTY SCHOLAR VIEWS CHURCH, STATE RELATIONS

AU270943 Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish May 84 pp 153-158

["About Religion and Religious Policy"--"Authorized statement" by Jerzy F. Godlewski at the all-Poland Seminar organized by the Higher School of Social Sciences Institute of Philosophy, Sociology, and Religious Knowledge--date and place not given]

[Excerpts] I wish to examine here—briefly and superficially, of course—some of the formulations relating to religion which are used by writers and scientists and which have almost become standard formulations. I have in mind three issues, which are of crucial importance in examining church—state relations, religious views, and religious policy. They are 1) the separation of the church from the state, 2) the religiousness of believers, and 3) the meaning of the church in Catholicism.

Scientists and writers speak of the separation of the church from the state, which is also called the separation of religious associations from the state and is understood as a pattern of relations within the legal system of the state, as a feature of many socialist and capitalist countries, a feature that is even recorded in the constitutional enactments of some of these states.

However, the principle of separation has not been unambiguously defined in its theoretical or normative meaning. It's definition also varies in the practice of public life. Generally speaking, the notion of the "separation of church from state" is understood as the independence of the state, the state laws, and the state authority from the influence of the church and denotes that the church has its own self-governing administration and organizational structure. At the same time, the church is always subject to state laws and supervision.

The church and the state were closely linked in the states of the Middle Ages. Nor did the reformation try to change this state of affairs. Today, too, there exist state churches in many countries (for example, Great Britain, the Scandinavian countries, Ireland, Greece, and, not so long ago, Italy and Spain). In line with constitutional enactments, in 22 countries only adherents to the state church may be appointed to leading state posts. The idea of the separation of church affairs from the state was born as late as the end of the 18th century as a result of the propagation of the freedom of conscience, that is, of the idea that religions are equal and should be treated equally. The idea

bore fruit in the United States when, in 1791, the first amendment to the Bill of Rights was made as an expression of the desire to ensure religious peace and to prevent any religion from becoming the ruling church in the state.

The introduction of the principle of the separation of church from state in the socialist community countries after World War II was primarily ideological-political in character. However, specific conditions of the individual socialist countries have made it necessary to define that principle in various ways. In the socialist countries the separation of church from state has never been treated as something divorced from the realities of the social changes in a given country. Historical traditions and the determining factors resulting from the role and character of religious associations in those countries were also taken into consideration. That is why in Czechoslovakia and Romania, for example, the clergy are paid from the state budget and the church organization depends on the state.

People's Poland decreed the separation of the church from the state, thus stressing the change in the pattern of the prewar church-state realtions, in which the Catholic religion played a privileged role in public life. In accordance with Article 4 of the 1925 Concordate, the Roman Catholic Church was governed by "Divine and Cannon Law" and many spheres of public law were religious in character. The secularization of public life in the PPR confirmed the separation of the Church from the state.

However, does this historical concept still possess the force, which justifies regarding it as an unchangeable legal public institution? "It is doubtful," Professor Adam Lopatha wrote in 1976, "whether there is any sense in talking about the separation of religious associations from the socialist state, especially in view of the fact that attempts are being made to interpret this separation as something that curbs the sovereignty of the state and exaggerates the nature of religious associations in comparison with other socialist organizations active in the socialist countries."

The socialist state is a sovereign state, and its sovereignty is external and internal. Internal sovereignty denotes that the state is a lay state, one which is independent not only from church organizations, but from their so-called moral judgment as well. It also denotes that all kinds of organizations set up by members of society, including religious organizations, have to subject their activities to the state as the only universal and sovereign organization of all the people. In the socialist state the religious associations are subject to state control and supervision.

The state's legal order determines the activity of religious associations. The superiority of state law over cannon law is indisputable. State authority is the source of the valid legal norms. The state is the sole repository of law and expresses the interests and will of the sovereign—the working people. That is why the socialist state does not recognize the church's ability to share in the structure of political power. There is no reason in all this that the state and the church should be treated in any way as two parallel agencies. It is, therefore, correct to speak against the background of all these considerations about the separation of the church from the state? It is possible to pose the thesis that the formula of separation is historical in nature and

that it is now a metaphor and a rhetorical expression, which obscures reality in every state. It is an explanation which does not define the specific features of the church-state relations in a given country. As Karl Marx wrote, "The explanation that does not define specific differences is not an explanation."

The religiousness of believers is another issue. Actually, our writers no longer write about progress in the laicization in the world and in Poland. On the contrary, many Catholic writers continue to stress that religiousness is supposedly waxing in the world, especially in Poland, because a high proportion of the people questioned about religion assert that they are "believers," because the churches are full to overflowing during religious services, because millions and millions of people come out to welcome the pope, and so on and so forth.

Is is possible to regard as believers those who view religion and religious practices as a custom and not as a factor that determines the principles of daily conduct? Is it only the atheists who violate the cannon of the basis principles of living side by side, who are responsible for pathological deeds and a reprehensible attitude toward work and property, who consume high quantities of alcohol, violate the church's teachings regarding abortion, who go to court to obtain divorces, and so on and so forth? One of the journalists working for TEMOIGNAGE CHRETIEN, which is published in France, wrote an article entitled: "The Full Churches in Poland Help Mask the Catholics' Departure from Christianity," Jan Dobraczyski cited a statement made by an academic pastoral clergyman who had asserted that "there exists a large group of young people who can be regarded as religious, but who do not believe. There is a separation in their lives between religious life and private life or, more simply, between belief and life. They regard themselves as believers because they attend holy masses and retreats and even say prayers, but during studies and work are exactly like everyone else. An outsider will not see Christians in them because the hierarchy of their values is similar to or identical with the hierarchy of the values held by the people who know nothing about any God and deny His existence. If you were to tell these young people that they are actually not Christians they would be very indignant." Further, Jan Dobraczynski writes that "it is possible to discern the process by which Christianity is created 'for show as a smokescreen for politics.'"

The present research into the world outlooks of specific social groups has explained little and has produced a crooked image of true religiousness. The new question is: Are the processes of laicization up to the Marxists' expectations? Is it that the model of consumerist world outlook—the outlook of a petty bourgeois who values, above all, money and the joy of possession—exerts too much impact on the mentality of society? In view of this it is becoming necessary to fill the world outlook vacuum with the convictions and attitudes resulting from the scientific world outlook.

Finally, the third issue—the church, or actually the Roman Catholic Church. To most people the "church" as an insitutions is represented by the clergy, and it does not matter what kind of ecclesiastical office a given clergymen holds, although the church's Teaching Office is the only body empowered to authoritatively teach the truths of Catholic religion.

The Roman Catholic Church's official sociopolitical doctrine is the doctrine of its Teaching Office. The presentation of the views held by clergymen, theologians, or spiritual or lay scientists who are not members of the Teaching Office amounts to private instruction, because their views represent only themselves and not the church. Reverend Professor J. Majka said: "The church is not a discussion club." However, such clergymen, theologians, and scientists can through their views exert pressure on the Teaching Office, which may adopt some of these views.

The priests have to obey the instructions of the bishops. "Even if you were most successful in the world," Cardinal S. Wyszynski said, "you must obey the bishops just as Christ obeyed his Father. You must renounce your own wisdom, plans, and measures."

That is why one should not overestimate some clergymen's statements on sociopolitical matters. In this regard one should look upon such clergymen as one looks upon other citizens. It is antisocialist propaganda that tries to exaggerate the importance of the opposition statements made by some clergymen, who represent only themselves and not the church.

All the questions discussed by me here are just a modest contribution to our deliberations, which require a broader context, more developed reflections, and research.

CSO: 2600/1075

OLTEANU, COMAN ATTEND ARMY COUNCIL PLENUM

AU112014 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1700 GMT 11 Jul 84

[Text] A plenary session was held in Bucharest by the aktiv of the Higher Political Army Council which discussed tasks devolving upon the party bodies and organizations to strengthen the party's inner life, to develop the critical and self-critical spirit, and the revolutionary military of communists in the light of the decisions of the party national conference and of the theses and ideas that resulted from the Mangalia meeting aimed at completely implementing the guidelines set forth by the supreme commander.

The plenary session was attended by Comrades Ion Coman, member of the Political Executive Committee and secretary of the RCP Central Committee, and by Colonel General Constantin Olteanu, member of the Political Executive Committee of the RCP Central Committee and minister of national defense.

In an atmosphere of great enthusiasm, the participants in the plenary session sent a cable to Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, RCP secretary general, president of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and supreme commander of the armed forces, in which they voice their boundless joy with which our country's army and all our people have welcomed the Central Committee decision on re-electing him-at the 13th party congress—to the supreme position as RCP secretary general.

They expressed their complete adherence to this elevating political act with deep-going and multiple historic significance. In the same unity of thought and feelings with all working people, irrespective of nationality, the cable continues, we view in your reinvestiture to this high position a clear recognition of the noteworthy qualities and everlasting merits shown during the more than 50 years of heroic and revolutionary activity you have generously devoted to achieving the supreme ideals of independence, social and national justice of the Romanian people, and to building the comprehensively developed socialist society, and to the noble cause of socialism and peace in the world.

It is our strong conviction that your presence at the head of the party and state is a sure guarantee of achieving new and great results on the road to socialism and communism, and a firm guarantee for the country's progress and prosperity, and for constantly increasing its international prestige, and a guarantee for its independence and sovereignty.

In conclusion, the cable reads: Inspired by the great prospects for socioeconomic development which are opening up for our fatherland, we assure you
that we will continue to act with determination to fulfill our obligations, to
devote our work energy and capability to mobilizing all military personnel to
completely implement the provisions on the political and military training of
the army and to achieve a new and better quality in the educational and instruction process, and to commendably fulfill the tasks devolving upon us in the
national economy, thus welcoming the 40th anniversary of the victory of the
antifascist and anti-imperialist revolution for social and national liberation
and the 13th congress of our glorious party with noteworthy successes.

CSO: 2700/230

ROMANIANS REVIEW WORK OF POLISH PHILOSOPHER SCHAFF

Bucharest REVISTA DE ISTORIE in Romanian Apr 84 pp 391-393

[Article by Maria Fonta and Ilie Fonta reviewing the work by Adam Schaff entitled "History and Truth," Political Publishers, Bucharest, 1982, 370 pages]

[Text] The development of the philosophy of history, of the epistemology of the social sciences and of the sociology of knowledge and historical science has contributed to the enrichment and diversification of the theories, concepts, theoretical and methodological tools of the epistemology of historical science and the theory of the dialectics of knowledge in historical investigation. In this context, the work by Polish philosopher Adam Schaff entitled "History and Truth" represents a valuable interdisciplinary contribution to the presentation and explanation of the social and gnoseological conditions of knowledge in the social sciences in general and that in history in particular.

Among the problems treated by the author, we propose to present and analyze those which we feel are more interesting and which, through the wealth of theoretical, ideological, social and political implications, represent a contribution to the development of the theory and methodology of historical research, the aspects and considerations which permit pointing out the beneficial and productive gnoseological effect of combining philosophy and history.

In order to show the need for reflection on the dialectics of knowledge in the science of history, the author surveys certain works from various historical periods on the French revolution—the main method, the basic social-political path for confirming the leading role of the French bourgeoisie in society and for the transition to a new type of social-political system--specifically being concerned with how this historic event gave birth to a multitude of explanations and interpretations. A. Schaff finds that the studies of historians contemporary with the revolution represent an additional proof that the investigation of certain historical events at the same time as or immediately following them is not a guarantee for finding their major significance and bringing out the place and role belonging to them in opening up paths or in blocking historical progress. The author maintains that although the historians who identified the causes of the revolution with economic development, with the social assertion of the bourgeoisie or with the masses' state of misery were correct, historical truth is more than a simple reduction of the causes of the revolution to one of these explanations. Knowledge of these causes is an unfinished

process in which new investigations and confrontations of opinions will permit the crystalization of a more and more complex historical truth and one which conforms more to the historical realities to which it refers (p 76). We should note the effort made by A. Schaff to select a group of representative historians (Mme de Stael, Laponneray, Michelet, Tocqueville, Mathiez, Labrousse, J. Jaures) for the main categories of explanations on the causes of the French revolution, bringing out the fact that the specialty literature became richer with new interpretations and theories as their new effects were demonstrated and studied by the historians.

In the chapter entitled "Gnoseological Presumptions," the author treats the problem of the relationship between philosophy and the science of history. He feels it necessary to appeal to philosophy, particularly to clarify a basic concept of history--historical truth. In order to support the need for this relationship, he brings to the attention of researchers the concepts of H. J. Marrou and E. Nagel. The former noted that the rupture between history and philosophy is one of the most serious dangers weighing upon the future of the civilization of the industrialized societies, a civilization threatened with drowning in an attrocious technical barbarity. Nobody would have to be concerned with history if it did not reflect first upon the nature of history and the condition of the historian (p 83). Nagel is referred to for his findings on those historians who rarely have the awareness of the concepts and the principles with whose aid they organize their materials or explain events, being more concerned with the specialized techniques of historical research, with the methods for decodifying and pointing out the significance of written documents and other vestiges of the past than with investigating the structure of historical explanations and the fundamentals on which they are based and the causal implications in the rise of historical research.

Referring to the philosophy of the knowledge and to general epistemology, the author makes a number of explanations in connection with the place and role of truth in scientific knowledge. With human knowledge being cumulative, it develops in time, which leads to the change in the form of truths gained from one stage to another. For that reason the knowledge of a subject should not inevitably lead to a single judgment, since, by reflecting various aspects, the aspects and phases of development of the subject are established in a series of judgments and are carried out as a process. As the author writes, "Judgment, too, clearly can change, can become more complete, more complex, which always depends on the development of knowledge and, in turn, it acts on the form of knowledge" (p 117). The work asserts that truth can be equal with a true judgment, assertion or knowledge and can be conceived of as a process, as an acccumulation of partial truths.

We should remember A. Schaff's concern with presenting the most representative authors who support the need for continuing to increase the contribution of philosophy in building the methodological and epistemological edifice of historical science and its disciplines and for evaluating and forming on the hierarchical system the interpretations and theories proposed by historians. Proceeding from the premise that philosophy may become the self-critical awareness of these disciplines, he tries to show this assertion by an analysis of the multiple implications of the concept of historical truth, dwelling in particular on the processual nature of working out and enriching it.

Treating the problems of the social conditioning of historical knowledge, the author analyzes the main current of bourgeois thinking on the investigation of history--positivism and presentism--pointing out from the positions of the Marxist concept of history their limits and negative consequences of the interpretations and practices they have caused. Whereas historical research for representatives of positivism is possible only through eliminating any subjective fact and through a faithful reflection of the facts, while establishment of historical science through a simple selection of a number of well-chosen facts and documents, with theoretical and philosophical reflection not being necessary since it has the negative role of introducing an element of speculation into positive science and a partial and committed attitude from the historian, the presentists think of history as the past seen through the prism of the present, with the interests and needs of the present determining selection of the historian's themes and orientation. For that reason history should be only committed, partylike and partial and should judge and interpret, while the historian, proceeding from the conflicts and struggles of the present consciously or not, should take a position, should commit himself and should demonstrate a partylike spirit.

While, as Schaff writes, positivism asserts that history, as res gestae and with respect to gnoseology, is established as a structure forever, the presentism maintains that history is not finalized and that it should always be studied in accordance with the continually changing interests and problems of the historian. So, conforming to this last concept, history continually changes and is permanently being rewritten, primarily because the historians' view of historical facts is continually changing because knowledge of man and society is continually developing, which brings new perceptions of past events. So presentism denies the value of the mechanistic model in historical knowledge and combats the theory on the historian's passive and contemplative attitude . Although he recognizes the merit of the presentists in explaining the way in which the historian perceives the historical process, determined by existing interests and social needs and the historian's attitude depending on his needs and interests and the struggles in which he is involved, critically relating to this current, the author reproaches them for the fact that they deny the objective existence of history as res gestae and recognition of its existence only as a thought on history and placing it in the positions of philosophical subjectivism. So, the ontological dimension of history disappears, with only the thought on history remaining, which does not have the role of reflecting the real historical process but rather of recreating it. Thought becomes a kind of primordial genetic principle, while its agreement with the real historical process is a minor problem. Negating the existence of the objective historical process makes it impossible to have objectivity of historical knowledge and confrontation with the reality of historical truth.

A. Schaff tries to show that the multitude of interpretations and theories formulated by researchers on the same historical event or on history in the end may be grouped into more than one school of thought. Completely opposed, positivism absolutizes the ontological aspect of history, while presentism absolutizes the one referring to the effect of social conditions on knowledge. By absolutizing the effect of social conditions on knowledge in history, the role of the scientific step and the possibility of establishing scientific standards

and rules which would be unanimously accepted is totally excluded. In conformity with this concept, history ceases to be a scientific discipline and becomes a stimple tool for serving social, political and ideological interests of the dominant classes and for justifying certain situations of inequality, privileges or aspirations. Criticizing the exaggerations and absolutizations of the two currents, the author assert that from positivism one may retain the idea of the need for considering the objective nature of history as res gestae and retain from presentism the idea of the social conditioning of knowledge in the science of history and of having the historian adopt a partylike attitude with the condition of specifying the nature of the social statute and the interests of the leading classes in society and their relationship to the requirements of historical progress.

Referring to a third orientation of research in the area of the social-political sciences, from the positions of Marxism the author critically presents the basic theses and ideas of the sociology of knowledge. The main merit of this concept is that by attempting to show the social conditioning of knowledge the critic is limited by the exaggerations and the absolutizations of presentism. that Marxism places a special emphasis on stressing the class conditioning of knowledge in the area of the social-political sciences, in light of the new research and the economic and social-political realities, A. Schaff shows that basic differences are kept between the ideology of the bourgeoisie and that of the proletariat, with the former keeping its feature of false and deforming awareness while the latter plays the role of a tool and scientific concept in the interpretation, change and leadership of society by the working class and its political parties and the role of methodological, epistemological and theoretical-explanational base for the social-political sciences and for studying the history of society from the positions of dialectical and historical materialism and from the perspective of the basic criteria of historical progress.

The author combats Mannheim's assertions on the false nature of any ideology. He shows that although knowledge in the area of the social-political sciences always has a social, class conditioning, this feature depends on the nature, interests and conservative or revolutionary status of the particular social class; in other words, knowledge in these sciences is scientific when the class which conditions it socially is in consonance with historical progress and it is deformed when its social supporter is a conservative class in the process of withdrawing from the scene of history.

In the Marxist concept the historian is subject to general social determinations which refer to society and to the era and to what is specific to the class or social group to which he belongs and whose interests he represents. Class conditioning, made conscious or not, requires that the historian be placed in a partylike position in conformity with the interests of the class he is serving.

A. Schaff dwelled on presenting the sociology of knowledge in order to combat its assertions on the deforming nature of any ideology and in order to keep the valuable ideas on the possibility of eliminating unproductive epistemologic knowledge and elements caused by the limits and personal downfalls of the researcher through the concept and carrying out of research activity as a social process for the achievement of which large groups of specialists participate, who take part in both working out new knowledge as well as in the criticism and evaluation of the scientific value of existing ones.

The author feels that the scientific explanation of social phenomena and processes means use of the method of historicism through which we understand the concept of reality—both of the objective world as well as its reflection in the thinking of people as a process in continual change and development, which means a genetic explanation of reality. The continued change and transformation of human knowledge, postulated by historicism, mean that it changes its content without interruption and that it is moreand more profound and changes qualitatively from one stage to another. Knowledge is an infinite process because the subject researched is infinite in exchanges, interactions and correlations. Historicism asserts the partial nature of knowledge in each stage of its evolution and the opportunity for gaining new partial truths which are objective but not exhaustive.

A. Schaff dwelled on the presentation of historicism in order to indicate one of the basic features of Marxism, one which differentiates it from the three currents of thought analyzed, since it brings out the dialectical nature of the phenomena and processes of society and postulates that the scientific understanding of the current ones requires the study of their origin and evolution and assertion of their historical nature.

In conclusion one may state that the work presented represents an important contribution to the emphasis on the nonscientific nature and limits of certain currents of thought in the investigation and interpretation of the various historical events and history in general. Also, with great competence and power of conviction it analyzes the need for joining the efforts of philosophy, sociology, general epistemology and epistemology of history in order to insure the continued development and improvement of the epistemology of historical science, which, in the Marxist concept, together with philosophy, plays an important role in the analysis of various methodological problems and certain basic concepts and explanational structures which are part of the basic tools and laboratory for historical research. The author succeeds in shaping his own original position from the perspective of Marxism in analyzing the objective-subjective relationship in historical knowledge and, particularly, in the complex and difficult step of explaining the multitude and diversity of viewpoints and interpretations of various historians on the same historical events as well as in that of demonstrating the processual nature of knowledge in history demonstrated by the need for its never-ending rewriting. Special merit is due to the study of the vast problems of the processual nature of working out and enriching historical truth and the investigation and writing of history. Asserting that philosophical and theoretical reflection on historical investigation shows the processual and cumulative nature of the writing of history and permits bringing out the limits of various schools of thought, Schaff pleads for an understanding of the need for continued enrichment of the historian's methodological and epistemological knowledge. Through all the steps taken the author demonstrates the superiority and scientific nature of Marxism as the methodological, philosophical and ideological foundation for historical research, criticism and evaluation of the scientific value of the results obtained.

8071

CSO: 2700/218

YUGOSLAVIA

WARINESS OF CRITICISM NOTED AMONG LCY MEMBERS

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1744, 3 Jun 84 pp 16-17

[Text] The current situation exacerbates the need for critical and self-critical thoughts about the League of Communists. At the same time, there are growing tendencies that block and destroy some of the prerequisites for such consideration, according to Dr Srdan Vrcan in his report for the conference on the party at the Marxist Center of the Servian LC Central Committee.

Overcoming the current crisis of economic and broader social development depends to a large degree on the manner in which the LCY fulfills its historic role, on the unity of fundamental interests and the unity of politically-conceived strategy. Using this assertion as its point of departure, NIN devotes its columns to current debates about the League of Communists. Two excerpts are presented below from the report of the well-known sociologist from Split, Dr Srdan Vrcan. The report was written for the scholarly meeting "Contradictions in the LCY and Its Prospects for Revolutionary Action," which is being held this week in the facilities of the Marxist Center of the Serbian LC Central Committee. Space does not permit the publication in our selection of the whole multifarious structure of Vrcan's presentation, which analyzes a number of contradictions that affect the LCY. Vrcan analyzes contradictions that burden the LCY with the burden of authority and force it to function by "relying on means of authority." Vrcan also speaks of "the manipulation of the nationality problem," on compensating for social problems by pushing national problems to the fore," on "substituting national mythology for the necessary democratization of social relationships" and on "achieving a permanent concensus based on such mythologies."

Let us first see what the author says about the prevailing social atmosphere:

An Undesirable Risk

[Vrcan] The current, extremely difficult crisis situation creates a constellation of powers and attitudes that hamper and strive to block any

attempt at critical and self-critical debate and consideration that might occur in the LC. In a crisis situation, the already-existing dissatisfactions of large parts of the working population with their social position and their criticism of the existing social order become stronger and more often expressed. But there are also expressions of the permanent defense mechanism that functions to see that every critical consideration and test of the situation is experienced and proclaimed to be a great danger that can only further threaten what is already threatened, and deepen the destabilization of what has lost its earlier stability.

In many basic labor and living environments, criticism is much more prevalent than previously, but its creativity for now is small. Even the smallest and best-intentioned criticism and questioning attitude is frequently seen not as a precondition for overcoming the existing unsatisfactory status, but rather first of all as a risk and a danger that must be avoided at all costs.

The defense mechanism as a rule functions in a manner that almost equally suggests and presses the idea that any critical testing and critical involvement with any part of the system can threaten the entire edifice of the sociopolitical system, even when it is openly recognized that there is a great deal that needs to be tested and questioned and when we declare that we cannot continue any longer in the old ways. From pure fear of threatening the entire system, we strive to block any public critical discussion, and to exclude from the realm of possible critical consideration anything that is obviously much more than problematical. Finally, these defense mechanisms are always united by the danger that we might open up and permit processes of public critical and self-critical thought that could not then be controlled and that could easily take on the nature of a sort of social avalanche that, once started, could no longer be stopped but would destroy, carrying everything before it.

Consolidating a Stable Majority

No special proof is needed that the LC is an indivisible minority and that, as an organization, it represents a permanent minority group in modern Yugoslav society. The LC also is a minority group within the working class. Of course, the minority nature of the LC theoretically does not come from a chance happening, or from any temporary coincidence of historical and social circumstances. On the contrary, its minority nature is in principle regarded as one of the relatively permanent features of the LC. That was clearly proclaimed by Kardelj, who pointed out that the LC "must be a minority, for only as such can it be the vanguard of social progress under our circumstances, that is, to perceive socialist practice in its entirety." That, of course, is no revelation relative to the traditional theory of the political party of the working class.

The innovation is in the fact that the LC has in principle rejected the possibility that self-management socialism can be realized and built through the rule of the minority. Kardelj was very decisive in that regard: "We do not support the rule of the minority, even though the League of Communists is a minority."

That is in harmony with the principle according to which the LC rejects any claim to force its monopolistic authority on society. Indeed, the LC declares in principle, according to Kardelj's formulation, that "stability of the self-management democracy is impossible if solutions for many social problems at all levels of self-management and social government are not approved with the support of the majority." Naturally, that means that in principle the LC is not prepared to accept the consequences that necessarily follow from the building of socialist society by rule of the minority. For that reason, the LC in principle strives, even though it is a minority organization, to be "the political strength of the masses, that is, of the majority." On that basis, the LC in principle sees one of its essential sociopolitical objectives to be to promote constant creation, rallying and consolidation of the majority around its fundamental social positions, and this creation, rallying and consolidation of a majority should take place even under circumstances where it is clear that modern Yuguslav society is not homogeneous. Rather, on the contrary it is pluralistically articulated in an interesting manner, in a cultural sense as well as in other realms.

Of course, that is an objective that is being pursued in a new way today. That means it is no longer posed as it was on the eve of World War I and immediately after that war, when the political organizations of the working class in many European countries had to choose between two strategies in that regard: they either had to choose the social-democratic strategy of "achieving revolution by majority" or the communist strategy of "achieving a majority by revolution." That, however, at the same time means that the objective is no longer posed as it was in Soviet Russia after the October Revolution, when in the 1920's the revolutionary movement encountered the first postrevolutionary crisis out of which Stalinism was born. It is very clear that that objective has not taken seriously enough, by several communist parties in power so that they did not recognize it and resolve it in a creative manner.

Of course, the objective of creating, rallying and consolidating a stable majority is not one that is resolved once and for all at the level of continuity and previous revolutionary contributions. In the present world conditions, with dynamic changes in society and crisis conditions as well, that task must be performed time and again. That is particularly true since it has become clear that a creatively productive or at least satisfactory solution to that problem is not something that is foreordained by some "iron" historical imperative...

And so that means that the creation, promotion and renewal of a stable majority is an extremely difficult and complex objective that is of primary importance for the stability of our self-management and for possible social progress. That objective puts the capabilities of the LC to the test daily; it must by its deeds affirm itself as the true vanguard which by its positions becomes acceptable to a clear majority of the population in circumstances of democratic public opinion, when methods of force cannot whitewash actions before the public, thereby eliminating the possibility of any discord, critical resistance or opposition activity.

On this general foundation it is possible to renew and strengthen various tendencies in individual parts of the LC that mean a clear return to positions

that the LC has overcome in principle and whose fateful consequences have long been clear. Those are chiefly positions that are generally very strongly present in ruling communist parties, and which in the last analysis mean slipping into authoritariansim, dogmatism and sect rule, which are merely different faces of one and the same thing. In reality, dogmatism and sectarian rule are not only deviations that appear on the level of the consciousness of the membership of communist organizations; they are a necessary accompaniment of the manifestation or face of authoritarianism.

A State of Siege

It is impossible to pursue an essentially authoritarian policy as communist policy without either falling into or renewing dogmatism and sectarian rule to some degree or other. Such tendencies in fact make absolutes of the minority positions of communist organizations, and in that context, of the LC, as a necessity from which it cannot escape. Those tendencies make absolutes of such a minority position beginning from the supposedly unfavorable general historical circumstances of the struggle for socialism, either from supposed weaknesses of a specific working class, its supposed lack of class consciousness and political immaturity, or from the supposed breadth of existing petit bourgeois attitudes. These are tendencies that on the level of political practice are manifested in the behaviors of a so-called permanent state of siege and permanent threats to the foundations of the social order.

Under current conditions, those tendencies are seen in various ways. First of all, they are seen in the doubt as to whether under our circumstances, the liberation of the working class can be implemented and in reality be confirmed as a process of general human emancipation. Instead, it tends to put the task of general human emancipation off to some distant future. more, it is seen to doubt the capability of the LC under today's conditions to implement its fundamental positions to "move the broad working masses, not just a slender governing layer, according to Kardelj's formulation. It is found especially to doubt deeply whether this can be achieved while respecting the democratic "rules of the game" in a fundamentally democratic manner under conditions when we must recognize not only the reality of self-interest and cultural pluralism, but also the socialist legitimacy of that pluralism. Those dogmatic and sect tendencies are most fully manifested regarding the actual role of the Socialist Alliance. Today it is naive to believe that the Socialist Alliance as currently in existence is in fact anything other than the direct consequence of the practical relationships in the League of Communists. Yet that is also seen in regard to other sociopolitical organizations.

12131

CSO: 2800/375

HIGH ATTENDANCE IN ORTHODOX CHURCHES ON EASTER EVE NOTED

Belgrade DUGA in Serbo-Croatian No 266, 5 May 84 pp 28-29

[Article by Rajko Djurdjevic: "Youthful Good Friday Believers: Why Are More and More Young People Going to Church?"]

[Text] The churches of Belgrade were full on Easter eve, but with whom, the faithful or the curious, and why, because of religion, fashion, defiance, or disappointment?

The sociologists say that we are experiencing a crisis of faith, but the faithful were assembled in great numbers on this Easter eve. Columns of mostlyon
young people walked quietly through the churches of Belgrade last night, past
the symbols of Christ's crucifixion. This evening the scene on Good Friday
is being repeated, with greater intensity and with somewhat greater animation
and ritual. The bells of the cathedral tolled the 11th hour, a time of heavier
attendance. A stream of churchgoers moved along the sidewalks and a great part
of the roadway of 7 July Street. Couples, families, and above all compact
groups of young people who first gathered at a party approached from Paris
Street and neighboring streets. With a certain amount of symbolism, some of
these groups were escorting elderly women. No one knows this evening who is
guiding whom into tradition, faith, and the past.

The cars of people who came early have already taken all the parking spaces. Kawasakis and Hondas have come up with motors roaring as they make their way through the throng!

Right at the entrance to the church four young women have alighted from taxis which have threaded their way through the assembled crowd. Their heads are not covered with shawls and they do not resemble ostentatiously devout persons, but they are holding candles lit before they left home.

The churchyard of the cathedral, the Church of Saint Mark, a Russian Orthodox church, and some other shrines appeared on this evening to have been transformed into the centers of all events in Belgrade.

All other areas of the city, especially centers of nighttime diversion, are deserted. Across the street from the cathedral in Question Mark Cafe for more than 100 years has provided secular inspiration for persons of the cloth, but tonight it has been ignored.

The waiters have relentlessly and speedily collected for checks and have energetically emptied the packed case. The door has been bolted 2 hours earlier than usual. Thus everything has been shut down. Firm believers have said that this is entirely proper; they rejoice that Hades is not to be in operation for the 3 days of Easter.

This evening people have concentrated their thoughts on paradise. The throng of churchgoers has already formed a living wall blocking the doors of the church. The churchyard has filled, and the two streets around the church are crowded. The large number of burning candles make the lighting stronger and impart a mystic tone to the scene. A greek bus full of students has arrived. The crowd presses forward. At the entrance a variety of ornate coiffures: two soldier's caps, one pitch black top hat, a broad-brimmed Italian borsalino on the head of a young girl. Faith appears not to care about differences in small things.

Greater church attendance by young people, especially at Christmas and Easter, has been observed over the last 3 years. This increased attendance has been a subject dealt with at youth meetings, in speeches, and in group discussions. We have far from having a solution to the riddle of why young people are going to church. Are the young today going to church more often than did their grandparents? Some say that the picture of attendance this evening has in it indications of snobbish display.

Is this statement merely avoidance of the truth that young people are searching their souls? How acceptable is the view that mass attendance has merely taken the place of true believers? Why this return to metaphysics? Are young people substituting one disbelief for another?

A system of certain values has been destroyed; this is not difficult to prove. A crisis of thought, a crisis of authority of elders, and a crisis of rationality. Why does the path of searching lead to the church? "You see, religion provides a traditional ethical model which young people follow," I am told this evening by a writer who is also an atheist. Ultimately the young soul in criticizing reality regards the predominance of the mercantile and pragmatic as an empty life. Man cannot be persuaded by material values alone.

Come On, Jorgas

At the entrance to the church elementary school and university students, Ljiljana and Branka by name, stand with their boyfriends. Two Jorgases, two Greeks, and a third young man named Matis, a freshman who has not learned to speak our language well. Also in the group is a Yugoslav named Dusko, who is said to be their godfather. Jorgas, a chemistry student, explains that they have been brought just by ordinary curiosity. He says that in Greece today there is also not as much religious fervor as there used to be. For 5 years Jorgas has been studying chemistry in Belgrade, but he points out that young epople have had their problems, yesterday and today. More so today than yesterday. Tradition makes an impression on the spirit. Why shouldn't this happen to me, he asks, and why should this be forbidden?

Jorgas and our Yugoslav girl will be married in church, and then asaying "ela, ela" she will be downright Greek herself.

The crowd parts, making way for Patriarch German, from whom the faithful receive a blessing. The clanging of the cathedral bells announce Easter, precisely at midnight. The procession of clergymen goes around the church, accompanied by the ringing of bells by two young deacons. The faithful approach and light candles; the churchyard is brightly lit. Under an enormous linden tree stand two young women, the only ones with hands empty.

"You have no candles?"

"No, I'm absolutely an atheist," says one of them. She explains that she has come here simply out of curiosity. A crowd had assembled, and so she came here, for the first time.

Her companion is even more emphatic:

"I don't even know how to cross myself. Just a minute ago I saw a young boy cross himself, and to met it seemed somehow foolish and primitive." They are both officer workers. They say that it would bother them for the people in their office to learn from the newspaper that they were even here.

Somewhat further on a young man was leaning against the wall of the church with a burning candle in one hand and a copy of PRAVOSLAVLJE and JEVANDJELJE in the other.

"No, I'm no fanatic believer. I don't know how many religious people there are here." Someone in the crowd adds, speaking of Christmas, "are there any believers here at all?" And this is just what I ask myself.

Flight Out of Spite

What then is the reason for this massive attendance? Ratko Bozovic, a political science faculty professor, explains the phenomenon in this way: "Discovery and search for origins lead far off along a vague and uncertain path, but just this is possibly what makes it appealing. The flight of young people into mysticism, into spite, is a consequence of failed achievement in the real world. This naturally does not lead to psychological balance. It is a wobbling about, but it expresses a certain antagonism toward things as they exist. The urge to change the world of one's parents is an old story. Grandparents are now more acceptable than parents. Parents are very close, but they have not offered realization of ideals. Young people have a psychological need to disagree with everything explicitly demanded from them."

It is the old story of parents and children. Ultimately, young people want to come face to face with religion, says Professor Bozovic. "There is nothing wrong. This is a false orientation, in areas of the affective domain, but the question remains whether the earlier passiveness of elders has now given rise to an active approach among the young. And here we have a pronounced form of duality, a division between what society expects from young people and what is actually happening."

Is this a harbinger of radical nihilism? All this is another field of inquiry. Young people look for their reasons in cracks in reality. Scientists concerned with this problem somehow stress above all the problem of the decline in living standards. After all, an army of unemployed young people has minimum faith in government authorities.

A blond young woman states with the forthrightness of an 18-year-old that she is in the church square tonight because young people have not fitted into other contexts of spiritual life. Her grandmother had told her that it is nice here, and the young woman acknowledges that this is really true. She adds that "I am not religious; to tell the truth, I am a member of the League of Communists."

A young architect near me, instead of replying, asks, "What's wrong with this tradition?"

In preparing this column I also interviewed hospital chief of staff psychiatrist Dr Jovan Strikovic. "It's true that young people have been filling the churches in recent years. It is an expression of willfulness, and so tolerance is needed," he states. "The young protest against everything in the world. As Marx pointed out, religion has played an important role in the survival of man. An archetypical practice is being brought back among the young in this atmosphere. The brain is an unexplored jungle, but nothing can be forgotten. The archetype is neither good nor bad until it is linked to man. And then it may be one or the other. We in our society broke with theism abruptly. This was a mistake. Memory rebels against it. After all, young people must go through the process of ridding themselves of false ideas. Life is no bed of roses. It is the height of stupidity to promise absolute happiness. This is an illusion, a brainwashing. Society has no reason to forbid such phenomena so long as they do not assume pathological dimensions and prove themselves to be destructive. I gladly talk to young people. They are educated, reasonable, and tolerant."

Psychiatrist Strikovic points out that it is necessary to create a reality suited to human needs. No single path is the right one.

Marxism as Religious Instruction

A certain Tanja, a targeted education student, became religious in her 17th year.

"I'm studying microbiology, and the more I read, the more I believe in God."

With considerable excitement she recounts the absurdities of her curriculum: "They say that we come from articulated worms or from an archeopteryx, a revolting, shaggy bird. It had three claws and fed on butterflies. That is what the teacher says, but she can't be certain that there really were butterflies then."

She lives in a family of atheists. Her parents are physicians, who were very unpleasantly surprised when she recently told them she wants to be baptized.

As she talks she leans against her boyfriend Dusko, a robust youth wearing kangaroo skin boots.

Tanja is also angry because no one can explain if mushrooms are living creatures, which "don't sing, don't bark, but still are living creatures of some kind." In school they are taught all about the family of symphyta, the only trouble being that she does not know what they are. A vague curriculum and cheap, hastily written textbooks alienate the students and dampen their enthusiasm. Tanja says that she is currently attending a school which used to be a gymnasium and is now called OVC. Everything is empty, sterile, unclear, and presented in the wrong way.

Branka Trivic, a postgraduate student in the field of sociology of religion, has concerned herself for some time with the phenomenon of the attitude of young people toward religion. She has many criticisms to make of the school curriculum. She is convinced, she says, that the crude atheistic concept of overcoming religion is impossible. Many subjects are becoming difficult and boring.

"Marxism in the schools today is having the same experience religious instruction did in the past. It is a pity that in education young people are given no room to satisfy their curiosity about the history of religion," she says.

She also points out that it is wrong to adopt only belief in God as an indicator of religiousness. This is only one form of belief.

"You see, Nikola Dugandzija in his book 'World Religions' says that 'the percentage of religious persons is far higher than the percentage of those who believe in God. Persons who have never asked for a clergyman's blessing are not irreligious. Their belief is even more intense. This belief may be in an ordinary person, in an object, a piece of wood, a cult outside the context of a church.' According to some figures, mmore than two-thirds of young people think that some faith is necessary. The church naturally gathers its believers and, unlike some of our institutions, adapts itself quickly. It accepts the achievements of modern psychology. At the same time, the philosophy of rejection is present in society. This is where it leads."

The religious Russian Tolstoy once said that "if the savage ceases to believe in his wooden idol, this does not mean that he no longer has a religion, but that he is longer has wooden idols."

Modern man is beset by difficulties; he is subjected to stresses and fear at the level of all mankind. This is at any rate one major reason for the search for the comfort of new values or old, well-tried forms which promise peace and quiet.

Five girls aged 17 to 20 were sitting on the sidewalk in front of the cathed-dral, with their legs folded under them, suffused with a lethargic mood.

"Don't write anything," one of them said. "My father will be furious both with me and with the newspaper. He is in the military and has no sympathy for something like this."

All five of the young women are in military families. Some of them have told only their mothers where they were going tonight. "After all, this is the only place in town where anything new is going on tonight," saysone of them. Another holds a lit cigarette in her hand; she says thoughtfullythat the countenance of God should be represented as the face of a child not yet spoiled by life. They point to one of their friends, who is an expert in reading tea leaves, in which she sees happiness, love, resignation. Their fortune-teller laughs, saying "each of us has his own god. He protects us from the briefs of everyday life."

The candles have burned down in the hands of the churchgoers. Many people in the church are listening to the choir. Dawn is creeping into the sky from the direction of Vracar. The young people step back, making way for the elderly and the country people, who have peacefully slept through this night and have got up for communion. Everyone has time and sins and prayers.

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